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Abstract  
The aim of this thesis is to understand the Greek-Orthodox of Constantinople 
through their historical course from the Byzantine period till nowadays, through the 
way they were depicted by the cinematographic lens as well as through the oral 
narratives of both themselves and other people who lived with them. Since they are 
the oldest community of the cosmopolitan Constantinople, their history is 
inextricably linked to the long history of the city. However, today the community 
does not count more than a few thousand souls. So, the question that arises is 
whether the community has a future or not. Despite the fact that its demographic 
collapse is a bad omen for its existence, there are still many optimistic voices and 
efforts from the Greek-Orthodox who still live in Constantinople and from those 
who do not live there anymore. The data and observations we explore here are 
based, apart from the historical sources, on two films as well as published and 
unpublished oral narratives, which address two of the milestones for the 
community. These are the riots of September 1955 and the deportations of 1964, 
when the Greek-Orthodox community was the sole target of Turkish nationalism. 
Based on these events and their consequences the issue of nostalgia and the way 
their identity and collective memory formed will be raised. 
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Introduction 
 
The presence of the Greek-Orthodox community in Constantinople,  is in lockstep 
with the history of the city. Being the oldest community of multicultural 
Constatinople, the Greek-Orthodox are distinguished from the other, non-Muslim 
populations. First of all, their contribution to the development of the city is attested 
by many buildings, such as houses, schools, hospitals as well as places of worship 
and cemeteries, many of which are true works of art and indicate that the Greek-
Orthodox was once a thriving community. Secondly, the other factor that 
differentiates them from the other non-Muslim populations is related to the 
changes they experienecd that eventually led to their demographic collapse. Being 
sometimes the sole target of Turkish nationalsm, the Greek-Orthodox were often 
forced to leave their city under cruel circumstances, or in other cases, after having 
reached financial ruin and experienced moral devastation, abandon their homes 
voluntarily with the expectation to find a better future elsewhere. A series of 
measures taken by the Turksih state culminating in the pogrom of September 1955 
and the mass deportations of 1964 resulted in the Greek-Orthodox community in 
Constantinople to consist today of a few thousand souls. 
Thus, someone reasonably wonders about the fate of the community. Are we 
talking about a diminishing community which will completely disappear? Even 
though in today’s Turkey many Greek-Orthodox nostalgically reminisce over a lost 
past when the community was flourishing and estimate that the future of the 
community is bleak, the majority tries actively to refute such scenarios. For 
example, they renovate churches, cemeteries and organize honorary ceremonies or 
gatherings of old classmates that “bring back” to the homeland the Greek-Orthodox 
who do not live in the city anymore. Furthermore, the teachers, who are the 
primary defenders of the Greek-Orthodox identity, are not limited in their 
professional capacity and devote much of their leisure time organizing 
extracurricular activities for the children, in order for the latter to maintain the 
Greek-Orthodox consciousness at a time that the effect of extraneous cultural loans 
is huge.  
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The hopes of optimists for “extension” or even revival of the community were 
strengthened by the improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey after 
the 1999 earthquake in Turkey when Greece had sent significant aid, as well as 
Turkey’s candidacy for its accession to the European Union, accepted in December 
1999. The indispensable reforms for its admission as a state-member of the EU 
focused, among other things, on the respect for human rights and protection of 
minorities. However, until nowadays Turkey does not appear to meet all the 
requirements to join the EU and consequently the path towards that goal is 
something that will take time.  
What is more, the community is protected and supported as far as possible by 
the Greek-Orthodox spread around the world. Organized associations and unions 
undertake to maintain the Greek-Orthodox identity and to initiate the younger 
generations in it. What is more, many of them who are living today outside 
Constantinople attend and participate in social events and religious celebrations 
without taking into consideration the significant distance that separates them from 
their former “homeland”. Thus, those who fled from Constantinople, even though 
they have adapted to the way of life of the place they now live in, they recall with 
nostalgia the native land and endeavour to contribute to the preservation of the 
remaining community.  
However, how did the traumatic process of the uprooting affect the formation 
of an identity of those forced to flee? What did the community members who are 
away from Constantinople choose to identify themselves with and how does the 
collective memory work both for those who still live in Constantinople and those 
who not? The purpose of this thesis is to understand the Greek-Orthodox of 
Constantinople through their historical course as documented in the books, 
examine said course as seen from the angle of the cinematographic lens and 
people’s oral narratives and finally, through this to discuss whether the community 
is likely to continue to exist or is doomed to disappear. In order to make this 
possible, the thesis was based on both primary and secondary sources. Thus, for the 
first part of my work, which is actually a historical review, I used secondary literary 
sources starting from antiquity to the 20th century. The axis of the second chapter 
is mainly based on primary sources. In particular it is based on two films titled Pains 
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of Autumn and A Touch of Spice. Through these films the pogrom of September 
1955 and the deportations of 1964 are analyzed extensively and the effects Turkish 
nationalism had on the processes of building a Greek-Orthodox identity is 
examined. After presenting some theoretical definitions of memory and nostalgia, I 
attempt to integrate them in the case of the Greek-Orthodox community and 
discuss them. Moreover, I made use of a Greek documentary series titled 
Protagonistes, as well as oral testimonies by the Greek-Orthodox of Constantinople 
in order to talk about the political agenda of the new Greek-Orthodox generations 
and the way they perceive the contemporary reality they live in. As we will see 
below the way they think is quite foreign to and removed from the old generations’ 
conceptions. Last but not least, in this thesis’ last chapter after having stressed the 
significance and contribution of oral history to both the field of historical science 
and other disciplines, I used published and unpublished oral testimonies of people, 
in order to show how a place forms the individual and collective memory.   
The first chapter focuses on the content of the term Greek-Orthodox, 
commonly known as Romioi, and its variation over time. Today there are many 
different scientific views about the term which thereby create confusion as to its 
understanding. Therefore, I considered that it would be helpful for the reader to 
begin by discussing this issue in order to provide a clear picture, as much as 
possible, about the content of the term and its development. Thus, this chapter is 
divided into three parts starting from the Roman Empire when Constantine the 
Great established the New Rome in the ancient city of Byzantion (later renamed 
Constantinople) and the term Roman was used to address every citizen of the 
Empire. During the Ottoman period, the population of the empire was divided into 
millets (communities) on the basis of religion and ethnicity. The millet system 
dominated by the Muslim millet, consisted also of the Greek-Orthodox (Millet-i 
Rum), Armenian and Jewish millets. Regarding the term Rum (Romios) which 
derives from the term Roman, it was used to refer to the members of the Rum 
milleti, which was composed exclusively of Orthodox people regardless their 
ethnicity or language. Under the millet system and particularly with the subsequent 
reforms of the Tanzimat, the millets enjoyed some privileges and a kind of freedom.  
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The transition from the Ottoman Empire to the newly established Turkish 
Republic in 1923 brought changes, since it was based on different principles from 
those of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey’s fundamental aim was to create a 
homogenous state under a common national identity. Thus, while all citizens were 
regarded as “Turks”, regardless their origins (ethnicity, religion, mother tongue) and 
despite the recognition of non-Muslim populations as minorities with the 
simultaneous recognition of their “rights” stipulated by the Lausanne Treaty, in 
practice they were always considered to be second-class citizens. The 
“Turkification” policy applied by the Turkish state essentially aimed at the 
weakening and eventually extermination of the Greek-Orthodox community. The 
milestone dates for the irreversible decline of the Greek-Orthodox community that 
will be discussed in this thesis are 1941 (yirmi kura ihtiyat), 1942 (varlık vergisi), 
1955 (the Septemvriana) and 1964 (the mass deportations).  
The second chapter consists of two sections that deal mostly with the riots of 
September 1955 and the deportations of 1964, specifically as seen through the 
cinematographic lens and specifically, as mentioned above, through the movies 
Pains of Autumn and A Touch of Spice. The chapter concludes with a reference to 
the Greek-Orthodox of today Constantinople and Athens including the old and new 
generations, the dreams of the latter and expectations of the elders. To be more 
specific, the first section begins with a historical report on the situation that led to 
the outbreak of the Septemvriana and later on the riots per se are analyzed in 
conjunction with the way the latter were depicted in the Pains of Autumn. How did 
the Turkish director of the film see the events and how did the Turkish audience 
react when they watched the movie, given that they knew little about the 
Septemvriana? What impact did these events have on the Greek-Orthodox 
community, what were the dilemmas they faced and to what extent was their 
identity affected?  
As far as the second section is concerned, it deals with the interval between 
1955 and 1964, when thousands of Greek-Orthodox holding the Greek citizenship 
were uprooted from their home taking with them the members of their family who 
were often of Turkish nationality. Based on these events but without making a 
deeper analysis of them, the film A Touch of Spice is an oral history structured 
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mostly by memories. It is narrated by a Greek-Orthodox, just like the director of the 
film, who tells the story of his family before and after the expulsions of 1964, how 
they were received in Greece, their difficult adjustment in the host country and 
eventually his reconciliation with the past. As already mentioned and since the film 
touches on general issues that pertain to memory and nostalgia for the lost home, I 
found it necessary to present the theoretical definitions of them.  Furthermore, we 
will analyze how they organized their lives in Athens, the problems they faced, as 
well as how they now identify themselves and what kind of relations they retain 
with Constantinople.  
Last but equally important, the section refers to the younger generations of 
Greek-Orthodox in Constantinople, which are quite different from the older ones in 
the way they perceive the current situation. Given that they did not experience the 
same events like their forefathers and living in a society where the whole situation 
is currently smoother, young people interact openly with their peers outside of the 
community. Politically, they also express themselves, relatively, more openly and 
vindicate, along with others, their generations’ rights. 
In the last chapter of this thesis the role of collective memory through oral 
narratives will be presented. The chapter which is divided into two parts opens with 
a brief discussion on the role of oral history as presented by Paul Thompson. Being 
the first form of history, it allows for more voices from all backgrounds to be heard, 
thusly rendering history more democratic. Hence, the first section examines the oral 
narratives of residents, Muslims and non-Muslims, of a cosmopolitan 
neighbourhood in Constantinople. The aforementioned residents still live in the city 
and were up until the riots of September 1955 coexisting harmoniously with other 
residents stemming from different ethnoreligious backgrounds. The narratives focus 
on an ideal coexistence and the events of September. Indeed, they are of great 
interest since in most cases the residents avoid speaking loudly about the events or 
they even claim that the riots never took place in their neighbourhood.  
  The second section deals with the oral narratives of Greek-Orthodox from 
various, also cosmopolitan neighbourhoods of the city, related again to the daily 
coexistence of different elements and their experience of the Septemvriana. The 
fact that these people reside today in Greece makes their narratives diverge from 
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those shown in the first section. They speak more openly of the tensions that 
existed and separated the different elements making up the neighbourhoods and of 
the riots of September, 1955.  
To conclude, regarding the future of the community, there are voices that 
argue that sooner or later it is doomed to disappear, whilst there are those who are 
optimistic and expect its revival. In any case, no answer can be given with certainty, 
since as history has proved the fate of the Greek-Orthodox depends largely on 
balanced relations between Greece and Turkey, as well as political developments in 
the latter, such as for instance its integration into the European Union.   
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1. The Romioi: From premodern to modern perceptions of a term  
 
There is an ongoing scholarly discussion on the Greek-Orthodox community of 
Constantinople, commonly known as Romioi1, and just as many different views, 
which cause perplexity and difficulties in understanding this term. Things get more 
complicated if somebody takes into consideration that the content of the term has 
changed in the course of history. For this reason it is necessary to explore the roots 
of the term Romios and follow the mutations of its content over time.  
 
1.1 The term Roman and its evolution during the Roman Empire 
 
The city of ancient Byzantion, which was to become the capital of the Roman 
Empire, was a Megarian colony founded in the 7th century B.C. The conflicts in and 
political instability of Rome during the Roman period (particularly since 314 A.D.), 
led to the weakening of the empire and eventually to the monocracy of Constantine 
the Great (324-337). The latter searched for a new place to establish the empire’s 
capital. Thus, in 324 A.D. Constantine the Great transferred his new capital from 
Rome to Byzantion under the name of New Rome. The inauguration of the new 
capital, which later was renamed Constantinople in honour of its founder, took 
place in 330 A.D. (Athanasiadi-Fowden, 1978: 32-33, 35,39). But, why did 
Constantine the Great choose this specific place to establish the new capital? A 
rather obvious reason is the location of the city in itself. Built on an ideal 
geographical position, between Europe and Asia and surrounded by the Aegean, the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea, Constantinople was protected naturally. 
Additionally, the city was fortified with impressive walls and any attempt at an 
invasion was proven to be extremely difficult (Doumanis, 2013:20).   
                                                 
1 In Greek, the term Romios is found as Ρωμιός or Ρωμηός. Even though in most modern dictionaries the 
word is found as Ρωμιός, written with iota (-ι), the correct spelling of the word is considered to be with 
an eta (-η), Ρωμηός, demonstrating in that way the perpetuation of the long vowel ligatures -αι in a long 
eta (-η) (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:9). 
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Despite the fact that Constantine the Great was a zealous supporter and 
protector2 of Christianity, he did not attempt to prohibit the citizens of New Rome 
from worshipping the ancient gods (Athanasiadi-Fowden, 1978: 35). At this point it 
should be mentioned that since Rome came into contact with the Greek civilization 
as early as the 3rd century B.C. (after its first war with Carthage in 264-241 B.C.), 
Greeks and Romans shared many characteristics. Consequently, since by the end of 
the 3rd century B.C. a large number of Romans knew the Greek language quite well, 
whilst, among other things, Greek architecture was influenced by the Roman 
(Bowersock, 1976:112).  Therefore, when in 330 A.D. the capital of Old Rome was 
transferred to the East, the two civilizations were no strangers to each other. The 
religious policy applied by the most important emperors of the empire, from 
Constantine to Theodosius I the Great (379-395)3 till Justinian I, turned 
Constantinople into the cradle of Christianity.  
What is more, the social and religious policies reflected directly on the culture 
of the empire. The new capital had to have a semblance to the Old one and thus 
new magnificent buildings, similar to those in Rome, were constructed in 
Constantinople, like a senate house and baths; churches of great architecture were 
built as well (Ousterhout, 2010:124,127). In the field of Letters and sciences the 
University of Constantinople4 was reorganized thanks to Eudocia Augusta, the wife 
of Theodosius II, while during Justinian’s reign the higher educational institutions of 
Alexandria, Caesarea of Cappadocia and Athens were closed down and legal studies 
were gathered in the schools of law of Constantinople, Rome and Beirut 
(Karagiannopoulos, 2001:90,109).  
The term Roman characterized every citizen of the empire, irrespective of their 
place of origin, and it was far from a derogatory title. The Romans considered  
 
                                                 
2 With the Edict of Milan, the decree for religious tolerance, signed in 313 A.D., Constantine the Great 
legalized the Christian religion, protecting in that way the Christians who were being persecuted until 
then by the Romans. 
3 Theodosius I convened, in Constantinople, the second Ecumenical Council in 381 and declared 
Christianity as the state religion and took strict measures against pagans and heretics 
(Karagiannopoulos, 2001:86) 
4 Known as Imperial University of Constantinople (Karagiannopoulos 2001:90). 
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themselves heirs to, descendants of the culture of the Eastern Roman Empire5. As 
opposed to the term Roman, the term Greek had already acquired a religious 
connotation the period of New Rome, which lasted throughout the Middle Ages. 
Greek (Hellene) became synonymous with the word “pagan” as it was used to 
define the religion of the Greeks (Filippidis, 1994:45). As it is indicated through 
Mark’s Gospel and other ecclesiastical texts, the above mentioned term, 
encompassing a religious connotation, seems to have existed and been used since 
the first centuries of Christianity before its spread and prevalence. Particularly, in 
Mark’s Gospel we encounter the description of a “Hellenis, Syro-Sidonian” woman 
(Filippidis, 1994:45). Thus, it becomes obvious that the origin of the woman is 
defined by “Syro-Sidonian” and the word Hellinis means that she was not Christian.  
It is worthwhile to mention, that the average people until the early 20th 
century believed that the Greeks were some ancient, pagan people (Filippidis, 
1994:48). This notion is reflected in numerous testimonies of ordinary people in 
Ioannis Kakridis’ work titled The Ancient Greeks in Modern Greek, Folk Tradition (Oi 
Archaioi Ellines sti Neoelliniki Laïki Paradosi), where the term Greek was used to 
refer to a race of husky people to whom however they did not feel related to or a 
continuation of (Kakridis, 1978).  
During the Middle Byzantine era (565-1081) the strong fluctuations the empire 
faced determined its fate. Invaders from different directions weakened the empire 
that tried to defend itself on several open fronts. Among the enemies, like Persians, 
Slavs and Lombards, the Arabs, who during the 7th century had conquered Persia, 
Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Armenia and North Africa were the toughest, managing to 
deal a heavy blow to the greatly shrinking empire. However, their attempts to 
besiege Constantinople during the 7th and 8th centuries bore no fruit 
(Karagiannopoulos, 2001:119-131). After a period of approximately three hundred 
years, during which the Empire expanded, was reorganized and succeeded in 
                                                 
5 After Theodosious’ reign the power was transferred to his sons, Onorios and Arcadios. The first ruled 
the western part of the empire, while Arcadius was responsible for the eastern one. From that period 
onwards, the empire was divided into two parts, though theoretically it was considered united. 
Karagiannopoulos points out that in the western part the dominant language was Latin and the culture 
was based on that of Rome, whereas in the eastern part Greek was spoken and the culture had its roots 
in the Hellenistic tradition (Karagiannopoulos, 2001: 88-89).    
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repelling its enemies, it fell again into a period of decline and stagnation. Due to 
political instability and reductions in military spending, the empire stayed 
vulnerable to the simultaneous attacks of the Normans, Hungarians, Pechenegs and 
Seljuk Turks (Karagiannopoulos, 2001:193). The latter were Oghuz Turks from 
Central Asia, who invaded Anatolia during the 10th century. They managed to 
become a great power by assimilating other Turkic tribes and in 1045 they started 
attacking the empire. After the battle of Matzikert (1071), where the Byzantines 
were defeated, they continued their attacks in order to consolidate their presence 
in the region gaining control over a large part of Asia Minor by 1081 
(Karagiannopoulos, 2001:187, 194-197). 
The late Byzantine era (1081-1453) was marked by many vicissitudes. The 
remarkable leadership abilities of emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081-1118) revived 
once again the empire and lent it its former status (Karagiannopoulos, 2001:199). 
However, that flourish did not last and when the Fourth Crusade was launched in 
1204, Constantinople fell under the rule of the Latins. During the reign of Michael 
VIII Palaeologos, the capital was recaptured in 1261, but could never be restored to 
its former glory (Karagiannopoulos, 2001:223-224). It was in this climate of fluidity 
that the Ottoman emirate emerged in the early 14th century. Having turned its 
attention to the Balkans, the Empire neglected the East, giving the Ottomans under 
Osman plenty leeway to establish an emirate within Bithynia. The end of the 
Byzantine Empire and the beginning of the Ottoman came about under Mehmed II, 
successor of Murad II, who conquered Constantinople on May 29th, 1453 
(Karagiannopoulos, 2001:251, 256, 276).  
 
1.2 The term Romios during the Ottoman Empire 
 
The conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans launched a new era with the 
latter as the main protagonist. The co-existence of Islam and Christianity, as well as 
the cohabitation of distinctive, non-Muslim communities that were incorporated 
into the empire, were issues that needed to be regulated by the new empire. The 
administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire was inseparable from the religious 
law, the Shariah. Consequently, Islam was not a mere religion separate from the 
  -11- 
political scene. In contrast, the state operated in accordance to the Shariah. The 
religious laws became most of the time laws of the state (Sarris, 1990:35-36). Thus, 
according to Islamic law the non-Muslim peoples, mainly the Christians and Jews, 
called dhimmis, were regarded as the “People of the Book” (ehl-i kitab) and enjoyed 
a kind of religious freedom, as well as the protection of the state. Nonetheless, this 
protection entailed often burdensome and humiliating restrictions. In reality the 
dhimmis paid for this protection granted by the state by means of a special tax, the 
so-called head tax (cizye or kefalikos in Greek). Other restrictions they underwent 
were related to their appearance, religion or daily life in general. Therefore, they 
were not entitled to dress like Muslims, or ride a horse; their buildings, including 
churches, had to be lower than those of Muslims (Barkey, 2008). However, Neoklis 
Sarris points out that the rights and obligations of the dhimmis were not 
predetermined, with the exception of the head tax, but regulated by occasion 
(Sarris, 1990:247). In any case non-Muslims were considered to be second-class 
citizens within the empire. 
In order for each Sultan to be able to administer more effectively the different 
elements that inhabited the empire, the millet system was established. This system 
addressed all non-Muslim communities and its special characteristic was the fact 
that it was based on religion and not on ethnicity, even though the word “millet” 
means nation (Alexandris, 1992:21). That is why it is estimated that the term millet 
is quite recent, with origins in the 19th century when we encounter also the 
emergence of nationalism. Until then, the concept of “nation” was still dim and 
distant. Therefore, it is supported that the word cemaat (community) was being 
widely used in order to describe non-Muslim communities (Sarris, 1990:266).   
The millet system consisted of the Greek-Orthodox (Millet-i Rum), the Jewish 
and the Armenian millets. Each of these communities enjoyed some privileges and 
some kind of autonomy in exchange for their loyalty to the Sultan. More specifically, 
the Rum milleti, which encompassed all the Orthodox people of the Ottoman 
Empire6 regardless their place of origin or their different spoken languages, was led 
by the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch (Alexandris, 1992:21-22). He was the so-called 
                                                 
6 Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, Vlachs and Romanians. 
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Millet-başı, which means “the head of the nation” (Ethnarhis), in this case head of 
the community, and hence he had responsibilities related to the community. The 
Millet leaders had jurisdiction over the communities’ internal affairs. For instance, 
the Millet-başı collected the taxes and had control over the affairs related to the 
educational and religious life. He was also accountable for all legal issues with the 
exception of the criminal cases, which fell under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman 
authorities (Alexandris, 1992:22). In other words, the Ecumenical Patriarch was the 
executive body of the Sultan and simultaneously the only and main responsible for 
the smooth operation of the community. In case the Patriarch was not able to 
ensure the required orderly functioning of the community, he was held accountable 
and paid with his own life (Sarris, 1990:273-274)7.    
As regards to the word Rum (Romios), it derives from the term Roman and 
refers to the descendants of the Eastern Roman Empire (Doumanis, 2013:9). During 
the Ottoman era the term was being used to refer to the members of the Rum 
milleti. The difference in the content of the term Romios between the two ages 
(Byzantine and Ottoman) is that even though in both cases it attributes religious 
substance, during the Ottoman Empire it specifies strictly the religion. It is probably 
safe to assume that the millet system provided some sort of religious identity to the 
members of these communities and as Smith claims religious communities are 
closely connected to the identities of ethnies (Smith, 1991:6). The features of an 
ethnie, a term used by Smith (1991) to define ethnic groups, are: 
 
1. a collective proper name            
2. a myth of common origin 
3. shared historical memories 
4. one or more differentiating elements of common culture 
5. an association with a specific “homeland” 
6. a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population (p. 21)  
 
                                                 
7One notable example is the case of Patriarch Gregory V, who was charged with incompetence in 
preventing the revolt of the Greek-Orthodox in Peloponnese and was punished accordingly by 
hanging (Sarris, 1990:274).   
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As already mentioned, the Rum milleti comprised, apart from the Greeks (Hellenes), 
also of other people, who were aware of their distinctions. However, since all of 
these different groups of people, met some of the above traits they were 
considered as a whole to be an ethnie.   
The status of the millet system began to change after a period of continuous 
weakening for the Ottoman state. The first signs of the empire’s decline began to 
appear after the end of the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566) and 
they were the outcome of both internal and external factors. As far as the internal 
ones are concerned, the outdated constitution of the economy, army and 
administration, the depopulation of the countryside, with farmers abandoning it 
due to high taxation and other factors that hindered their stay, the government’s 
corruption and the weakness of the Ottoman state to keep pace with the 
technological developments of the West, led to the emergence of various problems 
and to the weakening of the empire’s external policy (Giallouridis & Langidis, 
2010:59). Thus, the Ottomans’ defeat during their second attempt to lay siege to 
Vienna in 1683, is regarded as a landmark in the empire’s course. However, the fact 
which utterly shaped its fate and led it to disintegration was its defeat in the war 
with Russia (1768-1774) (Lewis, 1958). The terms of the Kuchuk Kainardji (Küçük 
Kaynarca) treaty signed in 1774 were unbearable for the declining empire which, 
among others, was forced to raise the trade restrictions imposed on Russia, 
according to which the latter could not maintain a fleet at the Black Sea. In turn, 
Russia allowed Greek ships flying the Russian flag to sail unhindered in the Black 
Sea. In addition, the treaty also granted Russia the right to protect the Orthodox 
Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Related to this issue, however, a 
controversy among historians has arisen. Some of them claim that the treaty indeed 
granted Russia the right to protect the Orthodox Christians, while other historians 
argue that Russia gained the right merely to represent the Christian subjects before 
the Ottoman government. In any case, it is certain that thanks to the Treaty of 
Kuchuk Kainardji, St. Petersburg was given free range to meddle in the internal 
affairs of the empire (Davison, 1976).   
Realising the declining course of the empire that led to certain disintegration, 
the European powers engaged in a struggle to divide between them the “garments” 
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of the moribund empire, known also as the “Sick man of Europe”. This is regarded 
as the beginning of the so-called Eastern Question and the rivalry between the 
Great Powers. On the one hand Russia sought an exit to the Mediterranean, thus 
jeopardizing the interests of England, whilst on the other hand the latter strove for 
the conservation of the Ottoman Empire, since the latter was considered a natural 
barrier to Russian expansionist policy (Anderson, 1966).  
Meanwhile, the emergence of nationalism in the 19th century, as well as the 
Enlightenment and the French revolution introduced a new era of changes in 
several domains for both the Ottoman Empire and the rest of the world. Although 
the modernization effort began in the 18th century, it culminated in the 19th during 
the Tanzimat era (1839-1876). This was a reform period inaugurated during Sultan 
Abdülmecid’s I reign (1839-1861) when an official imperial decree, the Hatt-ı Şerif of 
Gülhane, was issued in 1839. This edict reflected the empire’s last chance to be 
modernized, incorporating the Western model of life (Davison, 1963). Consisted 
largely of the European-educated Ottoman elite, the inspirers of Hatt-ı Şerif 
intended to improve the function of the administrative, judiciary and military 
institutions of the empire, as well as to provide protection and equality in the eyes 
of the law to all ottoman subjects, irrespective of their different origin or creed 
(Davison, 1963).  
Yet, the highlight of the Tanzimat era was the second reform decree, Hatt-ı 
Hümayun. Issued in 1856 and under heavy pressure by the European powers, the 
Hatt-ı Hümayun focused on the equal treatment of all subjects of the empire. This 
equality reflected in fields, such as taxation, education, appointments of 
government officials and the participation of all in all administrative and judicial 
bodies. The imperial edict of 1856 promised to apply the reforms of the Hatt-ı Şerif, 
as well as to legalize the millets (Davison, 1963). What is more, this period served as 
the springboard for the Ottomans’ partial “independence” from the Shariah, with 
the example of granting the Ottoman citizenship (Ottomanism) to non-Muslims 
aimed at the renewal of the empire composing of nationals with equal rights, while 
at the same time it led to the creation of some kind of patriotism (Davison, 1963).  
While the reformative course of the empire continued during the reign of 
Abdülaziz (1861-1876), a leader willing to respect in practice the rights of non-
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Muslims, the first reactions and their results were already a fact. Although, a perfect 
equivalence among the subjects of the empire was never implemented, it would be 
an omission not to say that the institution of communities was undoubtedly 
reinforced by the reforms of the Tanzimat (Alexandris, 1992:26-27). Thus, the 
members of the millets were given the right to hold high offices within the 
government. They were recruited for educational, administrative, judiciary even 
diplomatic posts, they were released from paying the head tax (cizye) as well as 
they could now be represented by local administrative councils (Davison, 1963). On 
the other hand, some reforms of the Tanzimat were not always welcomed by the 
non-Muslims and gave them reason to complain. For instance, prior to the Tanzimat 
era they were exempted from military service; now they were required to carry it 
out. According to Davison it would be foolish to assume that the equality in military 
service was accepted gladly by Christians, since at the same time Turks themselves 
avoided it whenever possible. Moreover, the equal treatment promoted by the 
Tanzimat was a disappointment to the Rum milleti, which until then had primacy 
over the other non-Muslims (Davison, 1963:59). Nevertheless, these reforms 
generally fostered the millets, allowed their members to feel more confident and 
bolstered their identity, whereas concurrently created an ambiance of uncertainty 
and discontent among the Muslim subjects. 
 
1.2.1 19th century: the period of nationalism and the Greek nation 
 
As already mentioned the 19th century was the era of nationalism. During this 
period a strong tendency towards the creation of independent states was detected 
in the Ottoman Balkans. However, before that the national awakening was a 
prerequisite. The Enlightenment movement and its spread throughout Europe had a 
significant impact on this process. The universal nature of the Enlightenment 
movement, which represented ideals such as the freedom of thought, rationalism 
and the shaking off of anything reminiscent of medieval times was adopted and 
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adapted8 by the Balkan peoples in order to liberate themselves from the Ottoman 
yoke (Sfetas, 2009:123; Kitromilidis, 1996). Thus, the role of the Church in the 
preservation of the medieval tradition, as well as contact with Europe and the 
influence of Enlightenment principles resulted in the national awakening of the 
Greeks, who revolted in 1821 in order to unite all Greek populations living within 
the Ottoman Empire’s boundaries (Kitromilidis, 1996:85-86; Sfetas, 2009: 130-133). 
However, who were in reality the Greeks (Hellenes) that constituted the Greek 
state? Were they only those whose native language was Greek or also those who in 
spite of them being Orthodox Christians their mother tongue was not Greek? As 
Koliopoulos observes the interpretation of the words “Hellene” or “Hellas” varied 
depending on the origin and education of those who used them. For instance, 
according to Isocrates Greek was considered anyone who received a Greek 
education, stressing thereby the significance of culture over that of language for 
forming the identity (Koliopoulos, 2003:35-36). Athanasios Stagiritis, who lived at 
the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, believing that language was an 
incontrovertible feature of ethnies (ethnic communities), and nations later, claimed 
that nations are divided by language. According to him religion does not lead to 
segregation of the nation. To justify his view, he used the example of the European 
countries which in spite of them having the same religion use different languages 
and are consequently divided into different nations, such as English, French, 
German, Italian etc (Koliopoulos, 2003:63).   
What is more, the national awakening of the Greeks influenced to a great 
extent some other coreligionist Balkan populations, like the Bulgarians, who “came 
in contact” with the ideas of Enlightenment through the Greeks. These populations 
established schools, where students, not of Greek origin, received an education and 
were taught Greek as well as the principles of Enlightenment.  Hence the term 
“Greek” came to mean the "emancipated person”. In many cases when the Slavs 
                                                 
8 Regarding the way the Age of Enlightenment was expressed in the Balkan region and West some 
differences are spotted. For instance, the West put emphasis firstly in the rationalism, while the concept 
of nation followed. In the Balkan area the opposite happened. Secondly, in the West was observed an 
inclination to the science and the natural laws. On the contrary, in the Balkans, the importance of the 
tradition had the leading role. Last but not least, the Westerners’ rational view turned against the 
Church’s oppression, whilst for the Balkan populations the Church was the key element in their national 
awakening (Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou, 2000:65).   
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became part of the middle class they adopted the Greek identity (Sfetas, 
2009:237,241). 
All these results derived from the forming of the Greek merchants class and its 
intense activity during the 18th century in the West, where they came into contact 
with the principles of Enlightenment and the prevailing view that Greece is the basis 
of Western civilization and thus themselves descendants of this “founding” culture9. 
This led to the formation of a Greek Orthodox Balkan intelligentsia, under whose 
“enlightened” influence Greek nationalism was born at the expense of the Greek-
Orthodox identity (Friedman, 1992:839). But why did Greek nationalism develop at 
the expense of the aforementioned identity? We must take into consideration that 
the distinguished scholar Adamantios Korais, who was an ardent supporter of 
modernity and one of the most important representatives of the Greek 
Enlightenment, supported and enhanced the historical continuity between ancient 
Greeks (Hellenes) and modern ones, rejected flatly the Byzantine, Orthodox past of  
the Greek-Orthodox. Parenthetically however, it should be mentioned that unlike 
Adamantios Korais, historians such as Konstantinos Paparygopoulos did not reject 
the Byzantine past of the Greek-Orthodox people. Instead, according to the latter, 
the Byzantine Empire was the framework that maintained Greek ethnicity and 
education and secured its survival through the changes of the Roman conquest and 
barbarian invasions (Kitromilidis, 1996:485). The attitude of Korais is justified by the 
fact that he envisioned a Greek-Orthodox identity less dependent on religion and 
more secularized (Roudometof, 2002:70-72; Roudometof, 1998:32). According to 
Korais, for the purpose of making this attainable, great emphasis should be given to 
education in order for modern Greeks to become worthy heirs of their ancestors. 
Thus, he attempted to renew the Greek language, abolishing all non-Greek words 
and replacing them with equivalent ancient ones (Roudometof, 2002:71; 
Roudometof, 1998:25). The term of Western origin “Γραικός” (Greek) which was 
already in use, albeit limited use, was popularized by Korais, who chose to use this 
ethnonym in order to determine the Greek-Orthodox saying “I suggested Greeks, 
                                                 
9 Here, the word “Greek-Hellene” does no longer retain the mean it previously held, when it was used to 
express “heathen”. Its meaning now is identical to the definition for absolute civilization (Friedman, 
1992:840) 
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because all the enlightened nations of Europe also name us as such” (Koliopoulos 
2003:72-73). 
While the term “Hellene” as well as “Hellenic nation” was adopted from the 
very beginning of the Greek revolution mainly by the revolutionary powers in 
southern Greece, the ethnonym “Γραικός” was preferred before and during the 
Revolution by those who desired to orient the nation towards Esperia (Western 
Europe). Last but not least, even though the word “Hellene” was not in wide usage 
during the Revolution, it finally prevailed without however eliminating the terms 
“Γραικός” (Greek) and “Ρωμηός” (Greek-Orthodox) (Koliopoulos, 2003:73-74).  
Yet, the aspirations of Korais did not find resonance with all Greek-Orthodox. 
Since many of them held prominent positions in public administration within the 
Ottoman Empire, and therefore considered themselves privileged, they remained 
loyal subjects of the Sublime Porte and did not desire any change. On the contrary, 
they preferred to maintain and advance the religious identity of the Rum milleti, 
rather than proceed to its secularization10. These Greek-Orthodox, who were not in 
favor of the 1821’s revolt, were considered to be traitors by the Greeks in Greece 
(Doumanis, 2013:31-32). Generally,  a distinction emerged between Romioi (Greek-
Orthodox) and Greeks (nationals). In order to explain what this meant in practice, 
the following passage of Doumanis’ work (2013) is cited below: 
 
The Byzantinist Peter Charanis recalled as a boy a moment of cultural dissonance on 
Limnos in 1912, after the Greek navy seized the remaining Ottoman-controlled islands. 
Soldiers were perplexed when the boy referred to them as “Greeks” and to himself as a 
“Romios” (p. 32). 
 
For a better understanding of such discrepancies resulting in identity issues, as 
illustrated above, we should take into account that since the 19th century identities 
were constantly changing. Anthony Bryer claimed about the Pontic Greeks that “at 
the beginning of the 19th century they identified in the first instance with locality 
                                                 
10 At this point, it should be noted that despite the high posts and the close affiliations with the Ottoman 
authorities they maintained, they did not neglect their community. On the contrary they were dealing 
with issues related to their Rum community, paying great attention to education (Alexandris, 1992:30).     
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and clan, “and as …Roman subject[s] of the sultan second”, but that by 1923 they 
had become “Greeks”, and only later, Pontic Greeks” (Doumanis, 2013:42) 
The preparation of the Greek revolution for the establishment of an 
independent state in the early 19th century, confirmed the distinctions that had 
been existed among the Greek-Orthodox Balkan communities and consequently it 
opened the path for the formation of national consciousness and for the desire for 
the founding of homogenous nation-states. Thus, with the formation of the Greek 
kingdom (1832), as well as Serbia’s autonomy in 1830 the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
recognized the establishment of independent churches in both states (Roudometof, 
2002:84). On the Bulgarian front however other changes were taking place.  
Bulgarian nationalism, which had begun to arise in 1840, had been asking initially 
from the Patriarchate the use of the Bulgarian language in church and the 
establishment of an autonomous Bulgarian church (Bulgarian Exarchate). However, 
although Bulgaria’s request was not accepted by the Patriarchate, the reform 
period of the Ottoman Empire (specifically the Hatt-ı Hümayun, 1856) served  as a 
fertile ground for the intensification of the Bulgarian demands, especially for an 
independent church (Douglas, 1996; Roudometof, 2002: 84-85). Thus, a few years 
later, in 1868, the Sublime Porte, excluding the participation of the Patriarchate, 
took charge of the case and allowed Bulgarians to appoint their own bishops and 
priests, who would be placed in regions where the Bulgarians were the majority. 
The Ottoman Empire at that time took advantage of the divide created between 
Greeks and Bulgarians in order to prevent any cooperation of the Balkan peoples, 
which in turn could potentially lead to an even greater revolt against the Ottoman 
state (Douglas, 1996; Roudometof, 2002:88). Finally, the Ottoman authorities 
recognized the Autocephalous Church of Bulgaria by issuing a relevant decree 
(firman) in 1870. Two years later at the Great Synod of Constantinople, the 
Patriarchate declared the Bulgarian Exarchate schismatic and denounced the 
“ethnoracialism” within the Church, which was being “exploited” by the Bulgarian 
Exarchate to implement its national vision (Roudometof, 2002: 88-89). Thus, 
according to Roudometof “…religious alliances became in effect national alliances; 
to be a follower of the Exarchate or the Patriarchate was treated as a proclamation 
of a person’s national identity” (Roudometof, 2002:89). 
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The Treaty of San Stefano, signed in 1878, terminated the Russo-Turkish War 
(1877-1878). The terms of the treaty were humiliating for the heavily defeated 
Ottomans. Among the most important, if not the most important term of the treaty, 
was the creation of a large Bulgarian state which included the greater part of 
Macedonia (Roudometof, 2002: 89). Needless to say that the terms of the treaty 
evoked strong reactions from the Great Powers, a fact which led to the decision to 
revise the treaty in the summer of the same year. With the Treaty of Berlin (1878) 
Bulgaria ceased to be the great state of the San Stefano Treaty and was split  into 
two autonomous principalities, that of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, while 
Macedonia was returned outright to the Ottoman Empire. As illustrated, Macedonia 
was the “apple of discord” mostly among the Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs because 
the area was inhabited by scattered populations (Roudometof, 2002: 89-90; Sfetas, 
2009). The outcome of this confrontation led to the outbreak of the four-year 
Macedonian Struggle (1904-1908). The hostilities came to an end in 1908 with the 
movement of the Young Turks and the restoration of the Constitution of 1876. The 
new policy required the ceasefire that brought an end to the Macedonian Struggle 
(Gounaris, 2007). 
The movement of the Young Turks had its roots in the emerging nationalism 
cultivated within the Ottoman intellectual circles in the late 19th century. The 
establishment of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terrâki Cemiyeti) 
was deeply influenced by the principles of the French Revolution and its members 
attempted to combine the relevant ideas with a feeling of patriotism. The initial 
objectives of the movement included the reconstruction of the Ottoman 
Constitution of 1876, the function of the Ottoman parliament, as well as the 
peaceful coexistence of all elements, regardless of their nationality or religion 
(Zurcher, 1992:246,248; Ahmad, 1969). Indeed, according to Doumanis, initially, the 
daily life of the subjects did not meet with any significant change. The Greek-
Orthodox preserved the right to teach in their native language and they had their 
own educational and religious institutions (Doumanis, 2013:147). Two of several 
testimonies included in Doumanis’ work, Before the nation (2013) are the following: 
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How could we not be happy? The Young Turks were promising many freedoms. We were 
embraced by Turks, and they said to us: “we will no longer call you infields. We are now 
brothers born of the same earth” (p. 145) 
 
We were fine until 1908, when we were told that we were now like brothers (p. 145)  
 
Nonetheless, the ambiance of equality and democracy was transient and the 
situation changed completely when the Young Turks changed their policy and 
attempted to replace the multiethnic empire with a homogenous Turkish nation 
state applying the method of “Turkification” to all subjects11. It is worth mentioning 
that this policy of homogenization, which was carried out in a violent manner 
caused many reactions in all ethnicities and minorities and led to various atrocities 
from massacres to genocides (Giallouridis & Langidis, 2010:68). In response to the 
policy followed by the Young Turks the Balkan states (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and 
Montenegro) formed an alliance and declared war against the Ottoman Empire. The 
First Balkan War (1912-1913) ended with the Ottomans having lost most of their 
European territories. However, the sharing of these areas and mainly of Macedonia 
proved problematic, which in turn led to the Second Balkan War (1913-1914). This 
time the war took place between the allies of the First Balkan War and more 
specifically between Bulgaria and the other three Balkan states and also the 
Ottoman Empire and Romania (Doumanis, 2013:148). 
As far as the First Balkan War is concerned, the fact that the empire was 
defeated from its former Orthodox subjects, who continued to have contact with 
the Rum milleti, aroused suspicions that during the First Balkan War, Greece 
received financial aid from the Greek-Orthodox12. In any case, the war of 1912-1913 
proved disastrous for the “sick man of Europe” and the price to be paid by the 
Greek-Orthodox as well as Armenians was steep. The CUP (Committee of Union and 
Progress) which undertook the regulating of such matters, proceeded to dismissals 
                                                 
11 From the CUP’s point of view the shift towards nationalism arose from the arrogant behaviour of the 
Rum and Armenian leaders, who allowed Ottomans to doubt the loyalty of their subjects (Doumanis, 
2013:145).   
12 The Balkan Wars brought approximately 177,000 Muslims in the Greek state. The government 
minding the Greek-Orthodox of Constantinople kept a neutral position towards them (Doumanis, 
2013:148). 
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of Greek-Orthodox teachers and boycotted Christian entrepreneurs, banning 
effectively the Turks from buying anything from their shops or having them in their 
service (Doumanis, 2013:148-149). 
During the period of the World War I the hostility and violence of the Young 
Turks’ movement against the Greek-Orthodox intensified. Areas of high strategic 
significance, like the Aegean shoreline as well as the coast of Asia Minor were 
literally evacuated almost of all Greek-Orthodox residents who were displaced to 
the interior of Asia Minor. Needless to say, that most of the times, these cleansings 
took place under cruel conditions. Almost one year after the opening of the Great 
War, 60,000 Greek-Orthodox were driven out eastern Thrace and sent to the 
interior of Asia Minor (Doumanis, 2013:154-155). As Doumanis describes, 45,000 
Greeks were forced to leave the region of Çeşme (Krini) and 50,000 to abandon 
Edremit (Adramyttion), Burhaniye, Bergama (Pergamos), Kınık, Dikili and Foça 
(Phocaea). The massive wave of persecution forced the Greek-Orthodox to walk 
long distances under unsuitable weather conditions with no supplies. It was clear 
that the goal of those marches was their extermination. And actually it was more 
than successful, since many of them, including the elderly and children were unable 
to cope with the hardships and eventually died in the transportation. What is more, 
the young able-bodied men were singled out and were forcibly integrated into 
labour battalions (Amele Taburları) (Doumanis, 2013:150,154-155). 
However, the brutalities culminated in the region of Pontus. The population 
there together with the massive killings that the other Greek-Orthodox faced had 
also to cope with the rising suspicions that wanted them to collaborate with the 
Russians, who arrived in the area in 1916 and occupied Trebizond (Doumanis, 
2013:156). This fact in accordance with the fate of the Armenians the previous year, 
led the majority of them to forming guerrilla troops in the mountains. According to 
Raffi Bedrosyan, the situation deteriorated significantly after the end of World War I 
in 1919, when Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) arrived in Samsun and organized the 
systematic extermination of Pontus’ Greek-Orthodox having by his side the chette 
(çete) Topal Osman (Bedrosyan, 2014). He was by far the best choice Kemal could 
have made, as he proved to be a ferocious executioner. More precisely, he and his 
troop did not hesitate to burn entire villages and their residents alive or to rape the 
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women left behind alone since their husbands were in the mountains. Doumanis 
(2013) cites a testimony of the only alive woman of Atta village: 
 
[…]The chettes of Topal Osman came and we were lost. First they killed, then they looted, 
and then they burned. Two or three women escaped, but they chased them and killed 
them. Only then did they rape them! I was hidden near the river, inside bushes. I heard the 
mocking [the dead women] “Aren’t you ashamed…” They killed the priest. First they 
knocked on his door. They broke in and nailed him to the door of the Church. There were 
many women in Atta that had fled from other villages (p. 156).  
 
The end of World War I entailed also the end of the Ottoman Empire. The 
victorious powers of Entente as well as the allied Greece were invited to the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1919 in order to define their territorial claims. Hence, with the 
treaty of Neulliy Bulgaria lost any right to lay claim to Thrace, which passed under 
Greece’s jurisdiction. Yet, it was the treaty of Sèvres, signed in 1920, that sealed the 
empire’s ultimate fragmentation. According to the treaty the “sick man” lost the 
greatest part of its territorial land, but “he” still retained Constantinople. The treaty 
granted Greece the islands of Imbros and Tenedos and the whole of Thrace and the 
Sultan accepted the demand of the Entente to entrust the administration of Smyrna 
to Greece for a five-year period (Giallouridis & Langidis, 2010:69; Alexandris, 1992). 
The favourable terms of the treaties for Greece, reignited the hopes for the 
actualization of the Great Idea (Megali Idea) and the creation of the Megali Ellada, 
which were also the main part of the Greek Prime Minister’s vision. The policy of 
Eleftherios Venizelos found many supporters both in Greece and Constantinople 
(Alexandris, 1992).  
By order of the Entente, the Greek army occupied Smyrna in 1919 and under 
the Congress of Paris’ permission it proceeded to conquer territories in Asia Minor. 
On the other hand, the treaty of Sèvres, which had never been recognized by the 
Young Turks’ movement, in conjunction with the military operations of the Greek 
military, resulted in a surge of intense nationalistic tendencies, a sample of which 
have been described above (Alexandris, 1992:65,67). Meanwhile, the fundamental 
political changes in Greece widened the gap between the supporters of Venizelos 
and those of King Constantine. In the elections of 1920 the political defeat of 
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Venizelos brought to power the hostile to the Entente, King Constantine. The 
outcome of the elections and the Allied forces’ anti-royalist position led to a gradual 
change in attitude towards Greeks and to “isolating” the Greek king (Alexandris, 
1992). Constantine continued the military operations and by 1921 the Greek troops 
had reached Sakarya River, almost a few kilometres away from Ankara. However, 
the Turkish forces under the leadership of the supreme commander, Mustafa 
Kemal, managed to displace the Greek troops limiting them in the region of 
Afyonkarahisar in the summer of 1921. On August 26, 1922, the Kemalists invaded 
and conquered Smyrna. The epilogue of the war was written with the burning of the 
city and the persecutions, murders and any kind of exaggerated violence against the 
Greek-Orthodox and Armenians.  
 
1.3 The term Romios in the post-Lausanne treaty period and the declining 
course of the Greek-Orthodox community   
 
According to Adam Smith, the nations in Western Europe preceded the emergence 
of nationalism. On the contrary, in non-Western cases the existence of nationalism 
was a determinant factor for the creation of nations. In his book National identity, 
Smith analyzes two methods leading to the development of nations. Thus, 
according to him the first one “was the process of bureaucratic incorporation 
leading to the rise of territorial and civic political nations”, while the other was the 
“process of vernacular mobilization for the creation of ethnic and genealogical 
political nations” (Smith, 1991:100-101). As far as the first case is concerned, it is 
divided into two categories; the imperial and the colonial (Smith, 1991:101). 
Evidently, modern Turkey belongs to the first type, since from an empire it 
transformed into a nation-state including all those features that, according to Smith, 
are required in order to become a nation. Briefly, these characteristics include a) an 
aristocratic base which means that the states are governed by an aristocratic 
culture pervaded frequently by religious influences, b) the existence of significant 
ethnic minorities, c) a bureaucratic state with a “modernizing” character and d) the 
existence of an “official” institutional nationalism, whose ultimate aim would be to 
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homogenize the population into a solid nation, trying to assimilate the “other”, 
alien features (ethnic minorities). For this reason several principles of what 
constitutes a nation are launched, with which everyone is required to comply 
(Smith, 1991:101-102). 
The transition from the Ottoman Empire to a new “secular” republic in 1923 
could be characterized as a “big bang”. The changes that took place were 
breathtaking, since the Turkish Republic of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the Father of 
the Turks) was based on different principles from those of the Ottoman Empire 
(Beller-Hann, 2001:35). The look westwards for new, contemporary modes of 
governance and the creation of a homogenized nation under a common national 
identity was the ultimate ambition of the Turkish state. The leaders of the Turkish 
National Independence Movement, who during the period of World Word I up until 
the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 attempted to follow a cleansing 
policy towards the non-Muslim groups living in the area (Komsuoglu-Birsen, 
2009:329). Thus, while in the Ottoman Empire identity was based on religion and 
the region was dividend into millets, the new state accentuated more the role of 
ethnicity. All the citizens of the Turkish Republic were perceived as “Turks” 
regardless the religious beliefs or their ethnicity. 
The treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923 came to ratify the borders of 
the modern state and impose the compulsory exchange of the Muslim populations 
living in Greece with the Orthodox Christians of Turkey. The only exceptions were 
the Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace, the Greek- Orthodox of Constantinople 
and those of the Imbros and Tenedos islands. Furthermore, the Greek (Hellene) 
citizens who settled in Constantinople before 1918 (établis) obtained the right to 
stay and enjoy the same privileges as the Greek-Orthodox13 (Pentzopoulos, 2002).   
     What is more, the Treaty of 1923 recognized the Greek-Orthodox, Armenians 
and Jews of Turkey as non-Muslim minorities and sealed, among others, their  
 
                                                 
13 Initially, the Greek citizens could stay in Constantinople for a seven year period. However in 1930, 
they obtained the right to stay permanently (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007: 38).  
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rights”14. The rights given advocated equality of all citizens before the law, 
regardless their religious affiliations. More specifically, the articles 39-45 of the 
Treaty guaranteed the concession of civil and political rights, the right to occupy 
public office and positions, the permission and assistance from the Turkish 
government in establishing and protecting churches and other institutions showing 
respect to their traditions, as well as the right to have their own schools and talk 
their native language, despite the fact that Turkish was the state’s official language. 
As far as the article 45 is concerned, it confirmed the reciprocal respect and 
protection of the Muslim and non-Muslims minorities’ rights, on the part of both 
countries (Imvriaki Enosi Makedonias-Thrakis).  
Nevertheless, the rights of the non-Muslim minorities and especially, in our 
case, the Greek-Orthodox remained so far a delicate issue and the Turkish state 
seemed to have neglected them systematically. After all, the preservation of the 
minorities’ rights was something that had been imposed by the countries of the 
Entente against the will of the Kemalist regime, which did not hide its intention to 
dispose of all minorities unless they accepted the unmitigated assimilation in the 
newborn, homogenous Turkish state (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:111). The 
priorities of Turkey included the establishment of a national economy which would 
be controlled exclusively by the Turks. The significant role that mainly Greeks held 
in the economy of the Ottoman Empire, now was to be diminished as much as 
possible. Hence, a policy of “Turkification” took also place in the field of economy 
with the establishment of the National Turkish Commercial Union (Millî Türk Ticaret 
Birliği) in 1923, which served the purpose to place the economy of the new state in 
the hands of Muslims (Alexandris, 1992:106-107). Consequently, many professions, 
both in the private and public sector, were “closed off” for the Christians, whilst in 
extreme cases they were forced to leave their businesses and country because they 
faced various kinds of threats (Anastasiadou & Dymon; 2007:39, Alexandris, 
1992:106).  
                                                 
14 It is worth mentioning that the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne treaty’s sessions did not accept the 
term “minority”, because if they did it would be like accepting the existence of various ethnic 
communities and thus the “dream” of establishing a homogenous nation-state could be never fulfilled 
(Komsuoglu-Birsen, 2009:408). 
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Nonetheless, this policy did not prove hard enough to cause irremediable 
traumas to the Greek-Orthodox of Constantinople. However, it was the following 
decades that marked the ominous fate of the Greek-Orthodox community. While to 
begin with, İsmet İnönü, the president of Turkey, kept a neutral position towards 
World War II (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:40) the single-party government of 
Turkey recruited men from the non-Muslim minorities aged between 22-44 in 1941, 
an incident known as the “Yirmi Kur’a İhtiyatlar Olayı” (Incidence of Reserves). Since 
the state did not trust the reluctant gâvur (infidel), who did not give into the 
Turkification policy, it did not provide them with weapons; instead they were placed 
on the fringe of the Turkish army. More specifically, they were placed in labour 
battalions working in road construction, just like they had been during World War I 
(Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:41). During that same period, the non-Muslim 
minorities became once again the target of Turkish policy. In November 1942 they 
were burdened with the capital tax (varlık vergisi) launched by the government in 
an attempt to get out of the economic impasse it had fallen into. In many cases the 
tax was too overwhelming for the non-Muslim minorities to afford it and 
consequently when their members could not pay the required amount or paid part 
of it, they were deported in Aşkale (Erzurum, Theodosiopolis in Greek) and later in 
Sivrihisar in order to be used in road construction (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:42; 
Komsuoglu-Birsen, 2009:411-412). Needless to say that this strict, discriminating 
measure left many Greeks, Armenians and Jews financially devastated, who fled 
Constantinople. Especially for the Greek-Orthodox the prospect of settling in Greece 
was far from safe as the country was under German occupation and later after the 
liberation, a civil war was to break out (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:42). 
As Anastasiadou and Dumont claim that despite the fact that the actions taken 
against the non-Muslim minorities had stigmatized the collective memory of the 
Greek-Orthodox minority, they did not open “unhealed wounds”, since they felt 
that only part of these hostilities was directed at them and they were not the sole 
target of. The “real” wound opened when finally the Greek-Orthodox minority 
became in fact the primary target of Turkish animosity. On September 6, 1955, after 
some rumours had circulated in Turkey stating that a bomb exploded in the house 
of Mustafa Kemal in Thessaloniki the day before, an unprecedented pogrom was 
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launched (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:43). On the night of September 6-7, 1955, a 
crowd of people from Constantinople and Anatolia attacked and destroyed 
everything on Pera (Beyoğlu) street. It is noteworthy that most of the shops in the 
area belonged to the Greek-Orthodox. Moreover, it is estimated that the riots were 
motivated by the government, since the brutalities took place under the watchful 
eye of the Turkish police, which did not make any effort to stop them. According to 
Anastasiadou and Dumont the tragic toll was approximately as follow: 1,004 
houses, 4,348 shops, 27 drugstores, 110 restaurants, 73 churches and 26 schools 
were completely destroyed. The riots of September 1955 (Septemvriana) made 
some Greek-Orthodox leave the country, but certainly not as many as one would 
expect in proportion to the size of the disaster (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:43-44; 
Komsuoglu-Birsen, 2009:412).  
Despite the above hostilities against the non-Muslim minorities in general and 
the Greek-Orthodox community in particular, the deportations of 1964 were one of 
the cruelest violations of the Lausanne Treaty. The concern of the Turkish 
government for a potential reunification of Greece with Cyprus, which had obtained 
its independence from the British Empire in 1960, was to be seen in the 
abolishment of the agreement made in 1930 according to which the Greek nationals 
resided legally in Constantinople under the status of établis. Approximately 10,000 
Greek citizens were forced to leave Turkey. However, the number was much larger 
since they fled with their family members, who had the Turkish citizenship 
(Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:44-45). The circumstances under which they had to 
depart brought once more to light how Turkey had become a hostile place for them. 
They were asked to leave within a few days taking nothing but a small bag only with 
the bare necessities with them. In addition to this, there were many, who despite 
being Turkish citizens left since the country’s climate of insecurity became 
suffocating15 (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:45). 
Considering the long-suffering course of the Greek-Orthodox of 
Constantinople, the community nowadays feels the need to hope for an auspicious 
future. A hope based, on the one hand, on the improved relations between Greece 
                                                 
15 More details about the riots of September 1955 and the deportations of 1964 will be discussed below. 
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and Turkey since the big earthquake that hit the neigbouring country in 199916 and 
on the other hand in the latter’s acceptance as a candidate for the European Union 
in December 1999. Nevertheless, this candidacy requires reforms in fields that 
“hurt” the Turkish Republic, since any change would create uncertainty and in 
reality would entail the dismantling of the Kemalist political system, namely a self-
abolition of the current power structure and re-establishment of the state. These 
indispensable reforms for its admission as a state-member of the EU focus on 
human rights and the emergence of minorities in autonomous entities. Such 
reforms would be quite positive for Turkey, which in no way seeks to return to its 
Ottoman past. The other measures aim for restricting the Turkish military’s role in 
strategy matters and abrogating its political role (Giallouridis & Langidis, 2010:28-
29). Evidently, the road towards a European integration of Turkey is difficult and 
long and the Greek-Orthodox seem to be aware of it.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The earthquake of August 17, 1999 that struck Nicomedia (Izmit) resulted in thousands of people 
losing their lives. The Greece sent substantial aid and then followed a period of thaw in Greek-Turkish 
relations (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:306).   
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2. From History to Cinema: identities and nationalism 
 
In the previous chapter we discussed, among other things, the milestone dates for 
the declining course of the Greek-Orthodox in Constantinople. What is more, the 
decades of the ‘50s and ‘60s became the beginning of the end for the community, 
since the pogrom of 1955, as well as the displacement of 1964 caused irreparable 
emotional and material damages that stigmatized eternally the community’s 
identity. In the present chapter the events of these decades are going to be 
analysed as viewed through the cinematographic lens of the movies Pains of 
Autumn (Pliges tou Fthinoporou)  by Turkish director Tomris Giritlioğlu and the by 
Tassos Boulmetis autobiographical film A touch of Spice (Politiki Kouzina). These 
films were selected because both address two important historical periods for the 
Greek-Orthodox community and also because they are seen the first one from the 
Turkish perspective and the second one from a Greek-Orthodox director.  
 
2.1 The Septemvriana (1955) as depicted in the movie Pains of Autumn  
 
Let us begin our approach of the Septemvriana, as illustrated in the Turkish movie 
Pains of Autumn. The film is a Turkish production of 2009, with a large part of the 
material based on the homonymous book written by Yılmaz Karakoyunlu. The Pains 
of Autumn is a historical drama that combines a fateful and tragic love between a 
Greek-Orthodox prostitute (Elena) and a moderate Turkish nationalist student 
(Behçet) during the days of unrest. Although the facts are presented from the 
Turkish perspective and therefore may be expected to have inaccuracies or even 
attempts to conceal details of a story taboo for the standards of Turkey, the movie 
approaches the historical facts with objectivity. The director said in interviews, “I 
dealt with the past to show what should be the future of Turkey”, while the 
screenwriter and editor of the Armenian newspaper Agos said, “This film couldn’t 
have been made ten years ago” (Barka, 2009; Today’s Zaman, 2009).  
However, in order for the reader to understand the Septemvriana, I will start 
with a presentation of the events that led to this outbreak. There are various 
scientific perspectives regarding the causes for the pogrom on September 6-7, 
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1955. Some believe that the riots were the direct result of the strained atmosphere 
between Greece and Turkey because of the island of Cyprus. Rumours of an 
impending attack by Greek-Cypriots against the Turkish minority that lived on the 
island sparked the riots in Constantinople. On hearing these news, according to 
Dilek Güven, the nationalist newspaper Hürriyet stressed in one of its articles that, 
“Here in Constantinople plenty of Greeks live whom we could attack” (Giouven, 
2006:13). Others regard the events of September 1955 as an impulsive outbreak of 
an angry mob following the news of Istanbul Ekspres paper, according to which on 
September 6th the Turkish consulate, and the alleged17 parental home of Mustafa 
Kemal had been bombed. What is more, there are also those who attribute the 
events to the feeling of inferiority that gripped the Muslims due to the non-Muslims 
and especially the Greek-Orthodox minority’s economic supremacy. Indeed, in the 
trial conducted in Yassıada in 1960-1961 concerning the events of September 1955, 
the Court condemned the pogrom of 1955 as a crime against non-Muslim 
properties rather than human lives (Giouven, 2006:13; Vryonis, 2007:68).    
   In any case, the Septemvriana should not be perceived merely as a 
spontaneous or isolated incident unrelated to the Turkish state policy, as Turkey has 
claimed on various occasions. On the contrary, it was completely interwoven with 
the county’s nationalist policy, as the movie illustrates, and therefore the roots of 
the problem lay in the first decades of the Kemalist nationalism, when the 
assimilation policy of the “others” began to be applied openly and identity was 
based on whether someone was of Turkish ethnicity or not (Giouven, 2006:13, 162). 
The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) of Mustafa Kemal having 
the taken advantage of the one-party regime exercised a fairly restrictive policy 
against the non-Muslim populations, who despite being considered legally equal to 
other Muslims, suffered under various kinds of restrictions. Thus, constraints were 
imposed on both the professional activities of non-Muslims, as well as in other 
fields such as education and social life, where they were forced to speak in public 
only Turkish. The latter was known as the Vatandaş Türkçe konuş (Citizen speak 
Turkish) movement (Giouven, 2006). While the movie makes no reference to the 
                                                 
17 The word-notion is attributed to Spyros Vryonis in his book The mechanism of Catastrophe (Vryonis, 
2007:69). 
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policy of the CHP, I believe the above imformation is of great importance in order to 
illustrate that there was almost no difference between the CHP and Democrat Party 
(Demokrat Parti). 
The insertion of the multiparty system with the establishment of the 
Democratic Party (DP) in 1945, led by Adnan Menderes, inaugurated a short-lived 
period of “breath of fresh air” for the non-Muslim minorities promising more 
freedoms and tolerance towards non-Muslims. Not surprisingly the CHP changed its 
stance toward minorities during that period. Many restrictions were lifted and the 
Greek Patriarch could now take part in the administrative affairs of the Greek-
Orthodox community. The change of the CHP’s attitude towards minorities came as 
no surprise, since the emergence of the Democratic Party in politics, would lead the 
CHP to lose potential votes. Nevertheless, the CHP’s efforts could not reverse the 
already created atmosphere of discomfort and the DP came out victorious both in 
the elections of 1950 and 1954 (Giouven, 2006:227-230,245). 
The DP’s promises were fulfilled as further favourable measures in the field of 
education were taken. The minority schools acquired their own organizations to 
resolve their issues. The goodwill between Greece and Turkey, partly due to the 
cooperation of the two countries as members of NATO18, was illustrated also in 
education (Giouven, 2006:242-243). Both countries decided to maintain and supply 
their own schools with curricula and sending their own teachers in minority schools 
to the neighbouring country. What is more, the relations between the Turkish 
leadership and the Patriarchate became more cordial than ever19. The Turkish press, 
on the other hand, was until 1955 quite sparing in its annotation regarding 
minorities (Giouven, 2006:243-244, 247; Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007).  
Nonetheless, it was quickly proven that the DP was equally close to the 
nationalist ideology of the CHP. Hence, even though in the early years of its power 
the country experienced an economic recovery and the government’s relations with 
the minorities had been ironed out, in the late 50’s the DP faced again a declining 
economy and therefore an increasingly disgruntled public of intellectuals and 
                                                 
18 Both of them became members of NATO in 1951.  
19 For the first time in the history of Turkey the Prime Minister of the country visited the Ecumenical 
Patriarch, Athenagoras I in Phanar after the latter’s visit in Ankara. 
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politically active groups (Giouven, 2006:248, 15). Needless to say that the 
government never fulfilled its electoral promises. As a result, the non-Muslims 
found themselves once again on the sidelines of the Turkish state. The capital tax 
was actually never returned, at least not to the extent it was expected, the reserve 
officers did not have the right to occupy strategic positions, whilst the minority 
communities had been unable to obtain permission from the government to 
conduct elections and establish community councils (Giouven, 2006:249-252).  
Being in such a difficult position, Menderes attempted to direct the people’s 
attention towards the Cyprus conflict. The strong interest of Turkey regarding 
Cyprus was greatly influenced by Britain. The film Pains of Autumn describes the 
turmoil that prevailed a few days before the Septemvriana. However, as Güven 
describes (2006), few years ago the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Necmeddin Sadak, 
declared:  
 
Sirs, there is no Cyprus question. I have said it before, when I was answering to questions 
by representatives of the Press. There is no Cyprus question, because this island is under 
the sovereignty and government of Great Britain. We know that England has not the 
slightest intention of transferring its rights over the island to another force and it has never 
shown any such intention (translation made by the author) (p. 304). 
 
As illustrated, until the early ‘50s Turkey’s position regarding Cyprus was neutral. 
For Turkey it was an issue to be handled between Greece and Great Britain and the 
Turkish state had no reason to risk the good relations with Greece that had been 
established in the ‘30s. Yet, Greece’s claim to unite with Cyprus and especially the 
Greek Prime Minister’s, Alexandros Papagos, intention in 1945 to raise the issue 
before the UN, were making Great Britain feel like it was losing ground. In order to 
reinforce its vulnerable position and avoid the charge of colonialism, the British 
persuaded Turkey to change its passive role and follow a harsher tactic regarding 
the issue (Giouven, 2006:304-306, 310).  
In the first scenes of the film we witness Turkey’s newly adopted passionate 
position, as depicted when the protagonist, Behçet, a nationalist student, attends a 
gathering of the nationalist group “Cyprus is Turkish” (Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti) with 
a leftist friend of his, Suat. In the film we can see the course of KTC and its 
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connection with the government unfold. Established in the summer of 1954 it 
became the main “executive body” of the Menderes government. Among the 
leading members of the committee was the highly respected by the Prime Minister 
Hikmet Bil, Hürriyet’s editor. With financial assistance stemming from the 
government and the reports of Hürriyet, which raised the Cyprus question to a 
national issue, the KTC strengthened its position by annexing more and more 
members, who originated from the opposition (Giouven, 2006:108-111). Evidently, 
Menderes by rallying politicians, the Press and the majority of the Turkish 
population managed to exercise significant influence at all levels of Turkish society 
and consequently could implement the policy he desired. This fact, according to 
Vryonis, is the key to those who argue, as it happens in the film, that after the first 
outbreak of demonstrations the situation got out of control. Vryonis mentions that 
it was a carefully planned political course and stresses that there is ample evidence 
proving that the anarchy could have been suppressed at any time (Vryonis, 
2007:108-109). He brings as an example the case of the Patriarchate and the Greek 
consulate, which were being guarded by military forces and did not face any 
problems in managing the rebel mob. He also referred to the inaction of the police, 
which watched the non-Muslims’ and mostly Greeks’ property be vandalized 
without interfering until the declaration of martial law that ordered the police and 
army to intervene (Vryonis, 2007:109). 
What is more, the movie reveals the corruption in the political circles. 
Government officials were aware of what was going to happen and in preparation 
for the events fortified themselves with equipment (in the movie). They also 
organized the murder of a newspaper director (Omer Saruhan), a moderate 
supporter and sceptic of the KTC, who was influencing Menderes. 
The communists were also a group closely watched by the secret police. In the 
film there are scenes that reveal the fury of the nationalists and the government’s 
actions against them. Specifically, the future father in law of the protagonist and 
right-wing extremist, Kenan Bey, “forces” Behçcet to betray the leftists he knew. 
Among them was also his brotherly friend, Suat. The highlight of that action is 
portrayed in the scene of Suat’s assassination by members of the KTC, who beat 
him to death in front of Behçet. It is noteworthy mentioning that a couple of days 
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after the riots the government blamed Communists for the events, an explanation 
which did not however convince the masses20, since there were only a few 
communists in Turkey and thus impossible for them to organize a rebellion of that 
scale (Giouven, 2006:104-105).  
Despite the fact that the government’s and consequently the organizations’, 
like KTC, target was Greece and the Greek-Cypriots, the situation soon began to 
affect exclusively the Greek-Orthodox community. The film presents this growing 
hostility through anti-Greek demonstrations a few days before the Septemvriana 
took place. Protesters used slogans like “Kıbrıs Türktür, Türk kalacak” (Cyprus is 
Turkish and will remain Turkish) and “Rumlar gidecek bu iş bitecek” (Out with the 
Greek-Orthodox) (Giritlioglu, 2009). The event that triggered the horrific events of 
September 1955 was the news that a bomb had exploded in the house of Mustafa 
Kemal in Thessaloniki21. Even though Greeks were accused of this bombing incident, 
it was later revealed that it was a well organized act by the Turkish government22. 
The film does not shy away from the truth, as it is depicted in the scene where 
Kenan Bey in a conversation with a like-minded confessed the organized bombing of 
the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki.  
What is more, the overnight marking of -mainly Greek- shops and houses with 
red paint before the events took place, as depicted in the film, was done in order to 
protect Muslim properties from vandalism. The members of the KTC had been 
supplied by authorities with lists containing addresses of Greek houses and shops in 
order to identify the buildings and destroy them23. However, in his testimony 
Donios Dokdakis said that the same procedure had been repeated two weeks prior 
                                                 
20 A few weeks later the Turkish government withdrew this argument.  
21 The state radio broadcasted the news at 1pm, while the newspaper Istanbul Ekspres, which circulated 
at 4pm of the same day, had published a photograph of the house of Atatürk in Thessaloniki after the 
explosion of the bomb. Vryonis in his book explains that the photograph had been tampered with 
(Giouven, 2006:31, Vryonis, 2007:146). 
22 From the trials of Yassıada in 1960 it resulted that the explosives were sent from Ankara to 
Thessaloniki on September 3. According to Vryonis, the preparation of this mission was a time 
consuming process, a fact that proves that the incident that was to trigger the pogrom had been 
organized long before. Thus, he rejects the statement of Hikmet Bil, who claimed that the pogrom was 
designed the evening of September 5th (Vryonis, 2007:145-146). 
23 The suspicion of the Turkish state towards the non-Muslim minorities stems from a report by the 
French consulate, according to which during the World War II information for the non-Muslims was 
recorded so that in case of  any turbulence the authorities could locate and exterminate them  (Giouven, 
2006:35).  
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to the pogrom (Giouven, 2006: 34-35). In the last fifteen minutes of the film we see 
how the events on the 6th and 7th September on the Street of Pera unfolded. At this 
point it is worth noting that the events had several outbreak centers, which erupted 
simultaneously and spread out to more remote areas, for example to the Asian 
side24. As it is vividly depicted in the movie, organized groups consisting of 30-50 
people, including Muslims who had been transferred under the care of the 
government from Anatolia and Thrace, carrying Turkish flags, crowbars, shovels, 
gasoline and other types of tools of destruction broke firstly the shop windows and 
then destroyed the merchandise. Even though they were instructed not to engage 
in physical violence or steal anything from the stores both25 occurred in reality and 
is clearly to be seen on screen. Streets filled with discarded commodities and a 
crowd verging on hysteria pillaging the broken stores was only one of the many 
scenes described by director Tomris Giritlioğlu (Vryonis, 2007:156-157; Alexandris, 
1992:257). In addition, the female protagonist, Elena, is brutally abused by the most 
hardcore ethnicist of the movie. In fact, over thirty Greek-Orthodox were killed, 
while many girls and women were raped. On the other hand, there were a few 
cases of Muslims who protected Christian neighbours or friends from attacks by 
convincing the mob that there were no Greek-Orthodox where they were going to 
attack (Vryonis, 2007:157-158).  
The same fate was also reserved for many churches and cemeteries of the 
community. Approximately seventy churches were burned and many cemeteries 
desecrated. Specifically, in the Balıklı and Sisli cemeteries many tombs were 
despoiled, among which were the tombs that belonged to Ecumenical Patriarchs, 
while in the cemetery of Sisli they opened the tomb of Nicholaos Iliaskos26, who had 
died a month ago, and stabbed his corpse (Vryonis, 2007:167, Giouven, 2006:40). 
Nonetheless, the film focuses on the atrocities that occurred exclusively οn Istiklal 
Street (Pera) and concentrates upon the anti-Greek character they had. It should 
                                                 
24 Even though the Pains of Autumn focuses on the riots based in Istanbul and specifically in Pera Street, 
alike events took also place in Smyrna and Ankara.  
25 The slogan that sounded throughout the vandalisms was “Evvela Mal, Sonra Can” (“First your 
properties, then your lives”) (Vryonis, 2007:157). 
26 Nicholaos Iliaskos was the uncle of the governor of the National Bank of Greece (Giouven, 2006:40). 
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however be noted that not only Greeks, but all non-Muslims, namely Armenians 
and Jews, came to harm. 
Overall, the film mostly received positive reviews from both progressive and 
conservative journalists and it was a great success for the Turkish box offices. 
According to film producer Fatih Ömeroğlu, the shooting of the film was difficult 
because the Turkish public knew little about the events of 1955. Nevertheless, he 
argued that the public has accepted the facts stressing that “Turkey is changing very 
quickly. Faster than Europe. The Turkish public longs to know its story without bias” 
(Barka, 2009). What is more, the Turkish journalist Uğur Vardan in a publication in 
the newspaper Radikal says, “There is much cacophony for which the Turkish state 
has to apologize. Pains of Autumn opens the door” (translation made by the author) 
(Vardan, 2009). On the other hand, there are negative reviews of the film such as Ali 
Murat Güven’s, who characterized the film as masochistic and claims that it was a 
subjective glance that aimed to present Turkey as a fascist country like Germany of 
1930. He blamed Tomris Giritlioğlu for her lefttist ideas that she strongly expressed 
in the movie, in which the Turkish nationalists were presented as the worst of all 
(Giouven, 2009). 
To conclude, Pains of Autumn seems to be a public apology for the 
Septemvriana. As clearly stated in the film, the events of September was not an 
impulse of the Turkish people, but a well-staged “business” of the Turkish 
government within the context of the nationalist policy to create a homogenous 
state. The Turkish people simply became the executive body-victim of this policy 
and scapegoat the Greek-Orthodox community. 
 
2.1.2 In the wake of the Septemvriana 
 
According to a report from the American consulate the aim of the Septemvriana 
was to decimate economically and morally the Greek-Orthodox community causing, 
thus, its fragmentation. Evidently, it was achieved to a great extent. Despite the 
Turkish government’s compensations, scant as they were, most of the merchants 
who saw their property be ravaged those days, failed to recover again. However, 
the principal blow to the community concerned the psychological impact. The 
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atrocities of 1955 had made it more than clear to the Greek-Orthodox that they 
would never be counted as equal to Turkish citizens (Giouven, 2006:267,280; 
Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:44). The trauma the Greek-Orthodox’ identity 
suffered is depicted in a written report by Patriarch Athenagoras to Menderes. In 
this text quoted by Vryonis (2007), among others, Athenagoras says:  
 
In fact, the very foundations of a civilization, which is a heritage of centuries and property 
of all mankind, was attacked. The sacrosanct of our religion has been desecrated […] 
Damages were caused to school buildings and the teachers suffered great losses. Worst 
than the damaging of the buildings is that it was an affront to the noble concept of learning 
and culture […] After the despicable attack on the foundations of their belief, their religion 
and honour, the sacrosanct family life and other gifts of prosperity, the feeling of being free 
citizens has been shaken to its foundation. Seeing that they are suddenly deprived of all 
protection, they live today in uncertainty, with concern weighting on their soul (translation 
made by the author) (pp. 249-250). 
 
Given the lack of any trust towards the Turkish state, the Greek-Orthodox 
found themselves in a dilemma of whether to leave their homeland or stay. It is 
true that after the events, the migration wave that was created was not 
proportionate to the violence. Their conscience, which stated that they are “more 
indigenous than the Turks”, to quote Anastasiadou-Dumont, seems to have been 
more powerful than any brutality (Giouven, 2006:272; Anastasiadou & Dymon, 
2007:44). The role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was crucial in their decision of 
whether they would stay or leave. Fearing a mass exodus of the Greek-Orthodox 
from the country, which would automatically lead to the weakening of the 
Patriarchate and therefore to its possible expulsion out of the county, the Greek 
Patriarch tried in every way to convince the community members to remain. In this 
struggle both the Greek consulate of Istanbul and the Greek government 
contributed. The latter acknowledged the importance of the community’s existence 
in Istanbul and hence raised bureaucratic difficulties for applicants wishing to settle 
in Greece (Giouven, 2006:273-274; Sarioglou, 2004:177). In addition to this, there 
were also other factors that forced them to stay. Since they were financially ruined, 
they firstly tried to become again economically stable. The other reason concerns 
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the government, which in order to avoid a massive transfer of funds of those who 
were to move out of Turkey, refused to issue passports prohibiting them essentially 
from leaving the country. In spite of the above obstacles, the applications for issuing 
visa with Great Britain and the USA as destinations increased and one year after the 
anti-Greek riots approximately 5,000 Greek-Orthodox, according to Guven, fled to 
Greece, the USA, Canada and Australia (Giouven, 2006:274-278; Alexandris, 
1992:270).   
Regarding the community members who decided to stay, they accepted more 
and more psychological pressure in every aspect of their daily life. The minority 
schools were placed under strict surveillance, since the Turkish authorities did not 
approve of the text books used, while the Greek directors were marginalized, with 
Turkish deputy directors, a position restored by the state in order for the minority 
education to be completely scrutinized, having the final say. Moreover, the 
community’s press was targeted by the Turkish government. Newspapers, which 
used to issue about 10,000 copies daily before the Septemvriana, were now limited 
to 3,000-4,000 copies after the riots. These papers included also those issued by the 
Patriarchate (Sarioglou, 2004:175,180). Evidently, the increasing intolerance 
towards the Greek-Orthodox affected the religious life as well. Athenagoras tried in 
vain to establish good relations with the authorities. On the contrary, he had to face 
rumours concerning the potential transfer of the Patriarchate to Mount Athos and 
he could not obtain permission from the Turkish government to renovate the 
Patriarchate and other institutions of the community. This hostile attitude towards 
Orthodoxy emanated from the growing suspicion on Turkey’s part, unfounded as it 
was, that the Phanar was involved in politics. Thus the Turkish press brought back to 
the forefront, in 1958, Papa Eftim27 who harshly accused the Phanar and especially 
the Patriarch Athenagoras of having been involved in anti-Turkish actions 
(Alexandris, 1992: 268,271). 
Certainly, the pogrom of 1955 had been the beginning of the end for the 
Greek-Orthodox community in Turkey. So far they had managed to heal the wounds 
                                                 
27 Papa Eftim was the leader of the Turkish Orthodox Church, independent of the Patriarchate, which he 
founded with the support of Ankara during the period 1919-1922. Papa Eftim managed to convert part 
of the Orthodox, Turkish-speaking population of Cappadocia, but after 1922 the organization declined 
and its role was mainly parasitic against the Patriarchate (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:161-163).     
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of the past and continue to live in a multicultural society, but preserving their 
identity. The years that followed somehow vindicated those who decided to leave 
after the riots. Τhe final blow to the Greek-Orthodox comes with the events of 1964 
which will be discussed below (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007). 
 
2.2 The events of ’64 as depicted in the movie A Touch of Spice  
 
In the period between 1955 and 1964 relations between the two countries were 
like balancing on a tightrope. The various immigration waves of the Greek-
Orthodox, the increasing insecurity the community felt and the intensified 
measures against it, such as the requirement to speak only Turkish, were products 
of the Greek-Turkish relations associated with Cyprus. Only in 1959 was there an 
improvement of relations between the two countries, when the independent state 
of Cyprus was established and the Zurich and London agreements were signed 
(February, 1959), which inter alia guaranteed the rights of the Turkish minority in 
Cyprus (Alexandris, 1992). However, shortly after the agreements were 
characterized as unsustainable by the Cyprus government and Makarios proposed 
amendments. In response to Makarios’ proposals for amendments, Turkey called 
for the partition of the island. Since the two sides failed to come to any 
compromise, the signed agreements collapsed in 1963 when armed clashes erupted 
on the island between Turkish and Greek troops (Alexandris, 1992:280). Once again 
the victims of those disagreements were the Greek-Orthodox of Constantinople 
who were caught like hostages between the two sides of the Greco-Turkish conflict.  
Turkey accused the Greek government of supporting Makarios and the Greeks in 
Constantinople of becoming richer in Turkey in order to finance the war of the 
Greek-Cypriots on the island abrogated the 1930 agreement on March 1964. As part 
of that accord the permanent residence of Greek nationals in the city that had 
settled there before 1918 was accepted (Alexandris, 1992:280-281; Anastasiadou & 
Dymon, 2007:44).  
In early 1964 the lists of deportees announced by the Turkish press included 
only a few families which, according to Turkish authorities, were involved in anti-
Turkish activities. Yet, the list of deportees’ names multiplied and hence the 
massive character of the expulsions was soon revealed. Approximately, 10,000 
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people with Greek citizenship were forced to leave the city taking with them, as 
expected, the members of their family who held the Turkish nationality. Among the 
“traitors”, as Anastasiadou and Dumont stress, were also elderly people who, 
despite the opposition of the Greek government, were not excluded from 
deportation (Alexandris, 1992:281-282; Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:45). 
In the movie A Touch of Spice, which is based on the expulsions of ’64, the 
conditions that led to the expulsion are not clearly explained. The movie is an oral 
narrative of the central hero, Fanis, who recounts the story and adventures of his 
family during the deportations of ’64 and their installation in Greece. Thus the film 
is structured by memories, while historical details are left implicit to be filled by the 
individual viewers. The fact that Fanis does not include in his narration details of the 
political state of affairs has to do with what Paul Thompson claims about memory, 
which is that the procedure of memory depends not only on the individual 
comprehension but also on interests (Thompson, 2008:172). In the movie, Fanis as a 
child was not interested in or was not able to understand what was “cooked” in 
politics and that is why he does not mention the political matters in detail. On the 
contrary, the narrator puts emphasis on the events that marked his own and his 
family’s life. The violent removal from the homeland and beloved ones (Fanis’ 
grandfather and his Turkish friend, Saime) becomes for Fanis a trauma. He says:  
 
I fear of people who wear uniforms [...] but most of all I am afraid of custom employees. 
The day we were leaving Poli, people who wore uniforms injured with chalk the little 
luggage we had with us. That sign resembled every Constantinopolitan’s trauma that came 
to Athens (translation made by the author) (Boulmetis, 2003).  
 
Evidently, the fear of people who wear uniforms and especially customs employees 
stems from the traumatic experience that the hero had when they were expelled. 
According to Anne Whitehead “the “memory” of trauma is not subject to the usual 
narrative or verbal mechanisms of recall, but is instead organized as bodily 
sensations, behavioural re-enactments, nightmares, and flashbacks” (Whitehead, 
2009:115). Thus, it was the past similar traumatic situations that Fanis’ grandfather 
experienced (1922, 1955), which caused the pain on his back every time that the 
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relations between Greece and Turkey deteriorated. Furthermore, after such 
incidents he used to send X-rays to his nephew (Emilios), who was a captain and 
travelled a lot, in order to show them to doctors. As Emilios hints later in the film, 
with that symbolic act the grandfather attempted to stress his concern about a 
possible future displacement from “his” city and how the political events hurt him. 
The same pain is “inherited” by Fanis, who feels it every time that a traumatic 
experience comes to the surface. It is the scene of the movie where the hero and 
the Turkish husband of Saime (Mustafa) have a conversation in a bath-house. Fanis 
feels the back pain when Mustafa says that they had not to leave Constantinople. 
However, the hero remembers well that they did not leave their homeland; instead, 
they were driven out.   
While the movie makes a brief reference to the process of deportations, I 
believe it is important to include some historical sources in order to illustrate the 
humiliation suffered by the community members. First of all, a series of economic 
measures were taken to ensure that the Greek-Orthodox could not liquidate their 
property, which was seized by the competent fiscal authorities. Moreover, banks 
were not allowed to approve loans for businesses owned by the Greek-Orthodox of 
either Greek or Turkish nationality. What is more, the conditions under which 
deportations took place were even more humiliating. Anastasiadou and Dumont 
argue that according to testimonies, people had only a few days to leave and 
furthermore, they were not allowed to take anything but a small bag containing 
only the bare essentials (cf.Alexandris, 1992:284; Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:45). 
Furthermore, they could also carry with them an amount of money, which did not 
exceed 200TL and were forced to sign a written statement, whose content they 
were not aware of. By signing this document, they actually admitted that a) they 
traded currency illegally, b) they were members of the “Hellenic Union of Istanbul” 
that had been accused of exercising an anti-Turkish policy, c) they had strengthened 
financially the “Greek terrorists of Cyprus” and finally d) they left the country 
voluntarily (Alexandris, 1992:284).  
To come back to the movie, the whole plot is closely related to the Politiki 
cuisine. As in Greek the word Politiki, depending where the word is stressed, may 
refer to someone who originates from Constantinople or to someone practising 
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politics, the same holds true in the movie, where the word Politiki holds a twofold 
meaning. To justify this notion, the hero says “The Politiki cuisine is also Political, 
because it is made by people who left their meal half way, somewhere else” 
(translation made by the author) (Boulmetis, 2003). Even the film itself, which is an 
oral narrative, consists of flashbacks and is structured in three parts related to 
cooking; “appetizers” (mezedes), “main dishes” and “desserts”.  
In the first part of the film, after some sequences unfolding in the present, the 
hero reminisces over his childhood life in Constantinople in 1959. Among his first 
memories is the importance and use of spices, not so much as the gustatory result 
they bring forth, which of course is of great importance, but mainly as a means of 
defining one’s feelings. Thus, Fanis’ grandfather used to say that cinnamon “brings 
people together, makes them look each other in the eyes”, whilst “if a diplomat 
smells of garlic things are not going well” (translation made by the author) 
(Boulmetis, 2003). The hero, who is taught his first astronomy and geography 
lessons from his grandfather (Mr. Vasilis) at his grocery store’s loft, is also initiated 
in this philosophy. These lessons are always conducted with the help of spices.  
What is more, the hero recalls the regular Sunday gatherings of all his relatives 
at his family home and the culinary feast in which they ended. In those Sunday 
gatherings everyone helped, while the women competed with each other in order 
to prove who has the better cooking skills. Such gatherings also took place during 
matchmakings, which were to be successful only if the candidate bride had been 
initiated into the secrets of the Constantinopolitan cuisine, or also during relatives’ 
arrivals, as is shown in the cases, when the family was waiting for the grandfather to 
come from Constantinople. The hero’s memories from these gatherings are related 
to Connerton’s theory about performative or social-habit memory. According to 
Connerton commemorative ceremonies and rituals are the practices that transmit 
cultural memory from one generation to another and he stresses that such 
practices are necessary to preserve the group memory. He characteristically says 
“All rituals are characterized by the bodily performance of set postures, gestures 
and movements, which are highly formalized, easily predictable, and readily 
repeatable”, stressing in that way that this kind of memory is mainly related to the 
body (Whitehead, 2009:133). In our case the gatherings, that took place not only on 
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Sundays but also at important moments in the lives of the heroes, become a ritual 
practice through which the community members maintain their cultural coherence. 
Within this “tradition” the role of each member is defined, specifying in this way the 
community’s identity. Thus, while cooking is considered a woman’s role, when it 
becomes known to the wider family that Fanis cooks and cooks well, instead of 
playing with the other boys his age, a question arises about his gender identity 
(Dermentzopoulos, 2010:180-181).  
As far as the relations between the two nationalities are concerned, they are 
illustrated by the close friendship of the hero with Saime, the daughter of his 
mother’s best friend. The two children spend hours playing together and when 
Fanis and his family leave to go to Greece, Saime is at the railway station to bid him 
farewell.  Another fact indicative of the relations between the two nationalities is 
the rapport between Fanis’ grandfather and the Turkish diplomat, Osman Bey, who 
holds the elderly man in high esteem, since he knows how to keep the balance28. 
For the same reason he has also earned the love of Mustafa, who characteristically 
says “I respected him very much. His opinions were always valued. And his 
knowledge on matters of diplomacy made a great impression on me” (translation 
made by the author) (Boulmetis, 2003). 
Few days before their deportation, the hero experiences another incident that 
stigmatizes his memory and that is the sound of the doorbell while the family is 
dining. Turkish police officers inform his father (Savvas Iakovidis), a Greek national, 
that his resident permit can not be renewed and he has to leave the city within a 
week. Since then, the sound of a doorbell or the phone ringing has interrupted each 
significant meal in the life of the hero (his grandfather arrival that never came to 
passing or the arrival of Mustafa after Fanis had asked Saime to stay together), 
always reminding him of the first sound that delivered the news for their 
deportation. Until the time of their exile, Constantinople had been the place where 
the hero was born and spent his childhood. The first individual memories, which 
according to Halbwachs operate under a collective memory, were created there. 
                                                 
28 When he asked Osman’s son, Mustafa, what he will be when he grows up, father and son responded 
simultaneously “a military man” and “doctor” respectively. Then Mr. Vasilis said “Both of them are 
good. But I think that when Mustafa grows up he will be a military doctor”, and so it happened 
(translation made by the author) (Boulmetis, 2003).  
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Halbwachs points out that collective and individual memory are not two separate 
things; on the contrary they complement each other. Even from our early age we 
are not alone and become part of various groups (familial, religious, political, social 
etc) and identify our way of thinking with the common mentality of each group 
(Thompson, 2008:173; Whitehead, 2009:126). Thus, when Fanis’ family later resides 
in Athens, Constantinople acquires even greater value and is idealized in their 
collective memory.  
The narrator’s first traumatic experience in 1964 is accompanied by the 
breakdown of his identity; “The Turks sent us away for being Greeks and the Greeks 
received us as Turks” (translation made by the author)(Boulmetis, 2003). The hero 
experiences this rejection of his identity from all the main institutions in Greece, 
namely the church (“Patisia has been filled with Turks”), the school and police 
(“How long has it been since your family came from Turkey?”), which stress the 
importance of Fanis’ adaptation to the Greek reality and him becoming a patriot 
(translation made by the author) (Boulmetis, 2003). However, despite all this, the 
hero refuses to adapt to his new circumstances and instead he continues keeping 
alive his nostalgia for the homeland through cooking, smells and cards he receives 
from and sends to Saime. The kitchen becomes a cultural space that connects the 
narrator with the place of memory and the beloved people he left behind, while 
dinner gatherings of all the relatives serve, among other things, as a means of 
preserving the community’s identity. According to the hero, this identity includes, 
apart from a certain mentality, also biological and aesthetical dimensions 
(Dermentzopoulos, 2010:181-182). Thus, the narrator since the beginning of the 
film, while describing his grandfather’s friends, talks about a distinct tribe: 
 
Their Byzantine origin makes them differ from the other Greeks not only historically but 
also biologically. First of all, they are magnetized. It is as if there is a hidden compass in 
their brain which over every question of geography redefines their identity. Who they are, 
where they come from and where they are going (translation made by the author) 
(Boulmetis, 2003). 
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This peculiarity is said to be related to their diet. While for most people food is 
related to taste and smell for them it has to do both with hearing and vision, using 
in this way all their senses. Hence, there are scenes in the movie, where we can see 
them choosing raw materials by using all the senses. Even Fanis’ uncle Emilios, the 
cosmopolitan captain who has travelled all over the world, when he returns from 
his travels he talks of his experiences always using cooking as a point of reference. 
Thus, he describes how women in different parts of the world cut onions and the 
fact that one can understand what every woman cooks by the way she moves. 
Despite the resistance of little Fanis to be integrated into Greek society, his 
parents manage to adapt to the new circumstances. Fanis’ father follows faithfully 
the schoolteacher’s advice that Fanis is not to read in the kitchen and the 
suggestions of the police officer, who stresses the necessity for the child to develop 
a national consciousness and become a patriot. These few sequences illustrate how 
the state “exploits” its key institutions in order to promote a particular model of life 
to be adopted by every citizen for the purpose of creating an overarching national 
identity (Borneman, 1997:97). The fact that Fanis turns “Kolokotronis” into a verb is 
a serious cause for concern for the schoolteacher and she emphasizes how 
important it is for the hero to know and recognize the Greek heroes. Nevertheless, 
their assimilation does not prevent them from maintaining their identity, traditions 
and memory within their home. The fact that Greeks treat them like Turks, as 
described above, causes bitterness increasing thus their nostalgia for 
Constantinople (“Greece was beautiful when we dreamt of it in Constantinople, 
more beautiful than what we found here”) (translation made by the author) 
(Boulmetis, 2003).  
The transfer of the hero’s grandfather to the hospital “forces” him to return to 
the place and time of his childhood. There, he encounters the images of his early 
life, Saime and his grandfather’s grocery store, in which he does not dare enter the 
first time. However, he finally manages to “fully reconcile with the flight and 
separation, having completely mourned this situation”, as characteristically the 
Constantinopolitan director of the film Tassos Boulmetis says, who had the same 
experiences as the hero did (translation made by the author) (Karouzakis, 2012). 
Being now an adult, Fanis understands why his grandfather did not intend to leave 
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Constantinople. In his return trip to Constantinople Fanis is trying to find not only 
the places but also the smells in the attic, namely everything that built his individual 
memory and identity. As Dermentzopoulos points out, the narrator is not looking 
for a lost homeland; instead he tries to redefine this homeland in the present 
through the collective memory. The hero’s conscious decision to stay in 
Constantinople permanently, despite having lost the people he loves that 
connected him to this place, comes from his reconciliation with the past. Thus, the 
fears that kept him away from Constantinople (when Saime asks him why he did not 
come back, he replied “Because I was afraid of the moment I would leave”) belong 
to the past (translation made by the author) (Dermentzopoulos, 2010:174,179). 
To conclude, A Touch of Spice is a Greek-Turkish co-production of 2003, 
directed by Tassos Boulmetis. It is an oral narrative recounted by the main 
character, Fanis, who narrates the story of his family and consequently of the 
Greek-Orthodox community, which were persecuted from Constantinople and came 
to Greece. The director himself is a Greek-Orthodox, born in Constantinople 
(Kadıköy, Chalkidona in Greek) in 1957 and his family was among those who were 
deported in 1964. A touch of Spice is a semiautobiographical story, closely related to 
Boulmetis’ own real life-story. 
The film received generally positive reviews and had a great impact both on 
Greek and foreign audiences. According to Boulmetis the success of the movie 
aboard is based on the handling of the narrative. As regards its impact in Greece, it 
was a huge box office and cut approximately 1.3 million tickets until February 2004, 
as well as winning eight awards at the 44th Film Festival of Thessaloniki (Karouzakis, 
2012; Smyrnis, 2013). Despite the commercial success of the film the comments 
received from both the Greek and foreign press were varied. For instance, the 
Turkish newspaper Radikal spoke of an enchanting movie, while Gazete Rize hinted 
that this film posed a risk to the Turkish national consciousness and stressed that A 
Touch of Spice was a Greek propaganda, which “played” with the Turkish identity 
(Alpay, 2009; Tasci, 2008). Furthermore, The New York Times talked about a movie 
that made “even cynics weep”, but the journalist found the fact that a middle-aged 
man like Fanis was “still obsessed with infatuations formed before he was ten” a bit 
exaggerated (Genzlinger, 2009). However, despite the laudatory reviews the film 
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garnered in Greece, there were also some who spoke of a “bad” screenplay that 
browses through history and a populist cinema “with predictable components that 
imitates other films” (translation made by the author) (Fragkoulis). Last but not 
least, while Boulmetis declares in Karouzakis’ article (2012), “I even made a movie 
by going back, having made peace with my family’s departure and separation from 
the country, having mourned that situation. Despite all this, I still feel a peculiar 
euphoria by my return to past familiar places”, he points out that some were 
furious with the positive way he presented the Turks (translation made by the 
author). More specifically, he says “They say they are animals. That we should have 
depicted them that way [...]. My own father is still angry about what happened, but 
I can’t be” (Karouzakis, 2012; Gibbons, 2003). However, the lesson he received from 
his parents and relatives was that they should not be angry with the Turkish people 
per se, and they are not, since the later were not responsible for the deportations. 
On the contrary, they are angry with the era’s system. The director still remembers 
the cries of their neighbours when they were leaving (Symvoulio Apodimou 
Ellinismou, 2009). 
 
2.2.1 The Greek-Orthodox of Athens and Constantinople today 
 
In the film A Touch of Spice, as analyzed above, the events that led to the uprooting 
of the Greek-Orthodox and their coming to Greece were described. As can be 
clearly seen in the movie, the Greek-Orthodox had difficulty adjusting to the host 
country. Coming to a place they had never before lived in or had no connection to, 
it makes perfect sense that they could not perceive this place as home. One of the 
reasons that made the adjustment difficult mainly for those who settled in Athens 
was the fact that they were frequently treated as Turks. Anastasiadou and Dumont 
point out that in many cases they were called Tourkosporoi (seeds of Turks) 
(Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:46, 67). In addition to this, they also faced livelihood 
troubles. In the early ‘60s Greece was plagued by unemployment and the state was 
unable to provide the newcomers with adequate financial support. Despite the 
adverse conditions, the Greek-Orthodox managed to stand on their own feet over 
time and to embrace the Greek national ideals without, however, having forgotten 
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who they are and where they come from (Iakovidis, 2014:2; Anastasiadou & 
Dymon, 2007:67). This is depicted through the fact that they maintained their 
customs and cultural heritage and as a consequence many of them, although living 
in a coreligionist and same language community, did not place themselves in the 
same category with the other Greeks (Elladites). According to Ilay Örs, many Greek-
Orthodox attributed the main difference to the Elladites to their different past and 
hence their cultural distinctiveness. On the other hand, they did not confess in any 
way that they were less Greeks, but that actually they differed from the Elladites, 
because they came from Constantinople (Ors, 2006:84-85). Nonetheless, there 
were those who did not feel “offended” when they were categorized as Greeks or 
those who considered themselves both as Grecoturkish and Turkogreek. Örs 
stresses such a paradigm of a Greek-Orthodox who said “I have two ears. When I go 
to Turkey I use my Greek ear; and when I am in Greece, I listen with my Turkish ear. 
My brain brings the two together; I am both Grecoturkish and Turkogreek” (Ors, 
2006:82). According to Örs this attitude is directly linked to the trauma that every 
Greek-Orthodox experienced and the way each of them chose to cope with (Ors, 
2006:82-83). 
Many Greek-Orthodox who left in the second half of the 20th century keep in 
contact with their homeland. The reasons that occasionally lead them back to 
Constantinople are both emotional and material. Many of them visit relatives who 
continue living in the city or relatives who are buried there, while others return 
because they have an estate to look after. The latter in fact have retained the 
Turkish citizenship in order to be able to preserve their property. Another reason 
that attracts the Greek-Orthodox from all over the world, back to Constantinople is 
the social and religious events that take place (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:68-70). 
The most recent instance is the event organized by the Zografion high school on 
November 20, 2014, which honored the graduates of 1964 and 1974, while at the 
same time celebrating 121 years of operation. The following day The Presentation 
of Mary was celebrated in the church of the Virgin of Pera, the first Christian 
Orthodox church built by the community during the Ottoman Empire in the 19th 
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century (1804)29 (To Vima, 2014; Symvoulio Apodimou Ellinismou, 2009). In these 
events Greek-Orthodox from Germany, Canada and Greece attended (Zografion 
high school, personal communication, December 5, 2014). For Anastasiadou and 
Dumont the reasons that make the Greek-Orthodox return every so often to 
Constantinople is directly related to their nostalgia of a time long gone. In the 
events in which they participate, they reminisce of the days of youth and images of 
a city that no longer exists (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:76).  
As far as the value of nostalgia is concerned, it was studied by Svetlana Boym, 
who explains that during the 17th century nostalgia was considered to be a disease, 
a curable one however30, that struck Swiss soldiers fighting abroad, as well as 
people who were away from their homes. The longing for one’s home caused 
illusions to nostalgics that made them, for instance, hear voices or see ghosts. What 
is more, they had no sense of time and as a result they confused the past with the 
present (Boym, 2001:xiv, 3-4). Nonetheless, the curable ailment of the 17th century 
turned into an incurable one in the 21st century. Boym says “The 20th century began 
with a futuristic utopia and ended with nostalgia. […] Somehow progress did not 
cure nostalgia but exacerbated it. Similarly, globalization encouraged stronger local 
attachments” (Boym, 2011:xiv). In her work The future of nostalgia Boym 
distinguishes two tendencies of nostalgia. The restorative nostalgia emphasizes 
nostos (return home) and with the nostalgics of this category attempting to rebuild 
the lost home through invented tradition, which in turn creates a stable framework 
providing continuity with the past31 (Boym, 2001:41-42). The second tendency 
refers to the reflective nostalgia that puts emphasis on algia (longing) and it does 
                                                 
29 The foundation of the church in 1804 marked the establishment of the Stavrodromi (Pera) community 
and it was ordained that the liturgy for The Presentation of Mary would be celebrated in the Patriarch’s 
presence for all eternity. Beyond the religious character of the event, which attracted and still does 
many faithful, it took the form of a memorial in honour of all eminents who contributed to the 
emergence of the Greek-Orthodox element. The church stopped functioning in 2003, because of a bomb 
attack on the British consulate, near the temple, on the eve of the feast caused damages to the church. 
The repair of damage was completed in 2009 and since then the church functions again (Anastasiadou & 
Dymon, 2007:72-73; Symvoulio Apodimou Ellinismou, 2009).  
30 Doctors used leeches, warm hypnotic emulsions, opium and a return to the Alps in order to ease the 
symptoms of the sickness (Boym, 2001:4). 
31 In order for the mechanism of restorative nostalgia to be understood, the difference between the 
customs of the past and the invented traditions must be clarified. The first ones are as variable as 
societies, even the traditional ones change over time, and the traditions are bound to change as well. 
On the contrary, the swifter the pace of modernization is, the more conservative the invented traditions 
become (Boym, 2001:42).     
  -52- 
not seek to rebuild the past. Reflective nostalgia has to do more with the individual 
and collective memory. The nostalgics are fully aware of the lost home and what 
matters is the narration of their stories which connects the past with the present 
and future. Thus, the past does not remain inactive; instead “it inserts itself into a 
present sensation from which it borrows the vitality” (Boym, 2001:49-50). In short, 
we are talking of an active and forward-looking type of nostalgia, which is different 
from a passive return to the past.  
In an attempt to keep alive the memory of the fatherland, the Greek-Orthodox 
have set up wherever they are societies and associations. In the present paper 
attention will be paid to the institutions of Athens. The approximately twenty seven 
societies have as common denominator the support, both moral and material, of 
their members and the promotion of an intellectual, philanthropic and moral 
conscience. Of great importance for these societies is the preservation of the Greek-
Orthodox identity and through various events they attempt to maintain the Greek-
Orthodox element and, if possible, reinforce it (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:76-
79). Thus moving around the same axis the “Union of Constantinopolitans” (Enosis 
Konstantinoupoliton), founded in 1981 composed of the “New Cycle of 
Constantinopolitans” (Neos Kyklos Konstantinoupoliton) and the association “Greek 
nationals deported from Turkey” (Somateio Ellinon Ypikoon apelathenton ek 
Tourkias) attempts to “promote the spiritual and cultural cultivation of all members 
in the historical past of the Greek-Orthodox population of Constantinople, and 
other regions of Turkey, especially in the subjects of the Orthodox Christian religion, 
morals and customs” (Enosis Konstantinoupoliton).  
Associations such as the “Study Association of the near East” (Etaireia Meletis 
tis Kath’ imas Anatolis) aim to promote research in the near East. Just some of its 
activities towards this purpose are the publication of scientific and literary journals, 
the organization of scientific symposiums, whose transcripts are published, the 
establishment and operation of a library, the organization of scientific events and 
speeches promoting knowledge regarding the near East (Etaireia Meletis tis Kath’ 
imas Anatolis). 
What is more, there are associations which have developed political action. 
Such an instance is the “Society of Greek Nationals deported from Turkey”, founded 
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in 1964, which among others, dwells on the events of ’55 and ’64 and exerts 
pressure on the Turkish government in order for the latter to admit publicly the 
extortionate measures exerted during the period 1955-1964 against the Greeks, 
who were expelled with the charge of being traitors. It is noteworthy that in the 
association’s charter a detailed report on this issue is included (Enosis 
Konstantinoupoliton). 
 Nonetheless, the role of these institutions is to adapt to the needs of their 
members. In recent years one of those needs is the dissemination of the 
Constantinopolitan, cultural heritage to the second generation Greek-Orthodox 
among which are some who do not identify themselves as Greek-Orthodox or have 
not visited once Constantinople. The risk of the expatriate Hellenism of severing 
every missing link with Constantinople sounds the alarm for the Greek-Orthodox 
associations of Athens, that  seek through a multitude of events, publications32, 
excursions, exhibitions, musical events and activities for youth and children to 
stimulate the Greek-Orthodox identity (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:79-81). A 
recent example is the third festival of Constantinopolitans organized by the 
“Universal Federation of Constantinopolitans” (ΟΙ.ΟΜ.ΚO) on 3-5 October 2014. 
Judging from the festival’s program, most of the events were addressed to children 
or young people, who in effect were not to be mere spectators but take part in 
these festivities (Alimosonline, 2014). 
As far as Constantinople’s Greek-Orthodox community’s youth is concerned, 
“they are not the children of a fearful minority”, claimed characteristically in the 
documentary of Stavros Theodorakis, Protagonistes John Gigourtsis, who is a 
teacher at the Great School of the Nation (translation made by the author) 
(Theodorakis, 2013). Let at this point be said, that at least the Greek-Orthodox 
youth is not as fearful as the previous generations, who experienced acute crisis 
situations33. In effect, the young people of the community see things in a different 
                                                 
32 Besides the book publishing related to Constantinople, newspapers in Athens and Thessaloniki are 
issued having as a central theme Constantinople. Indicatively, such newspapers are East (Anatoli), 
Constantinopolitan (Politis), Eptalofos, The Pulse of Constantinopolitans (O Palmos ton 
Konstantinoupoliton) (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:81).   
33 In Protagonistes some of the Greek-Orthodox students said that in many cases, for example in some 
neighbourhoods, they are still afraid to admit their religion or sometimes hide the cross they wear. On 
the other hand, others say they have never faced such a problem (Theodorakis, 2013). 
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way. The relative “stabilization” of the Greek-Turkish relations and the demographic 
collapse of the community, which in turn intensified the phenomenon of mixed 
marriages, since the Greek-Orthodox when they come of marriageable age are 
facing the spouse search problem, contributed to this. All the above combined with 
the fact that the new generation of Turks largely composed of “westernized” 
younger people, who resist the authoritarian principles of Erdoğan’s government 
that shows them how to live, how many children to give birth to, and interferes in 
their personal rights (such as the issue of abortions), make easier the exchange-
adoption of views and cultures among young people (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007; 
Theodorakis, 2013).  
In the events of the Gezi Park in May 2013, which began as a protest against 
the destruction of the park that was to be turned into a commercial center by the 
government, developed into a broader protest against Erdoğan’s policy and there 
were many Greek-Orthodox who participated. Young people argue that there were 
no political party supporters involved in the incident at Gezi Park. According to 
Chronis Pechlivanidis (director) fewer Greek-Orthodox in comparison to other 
minorities participated. He attributes this fact to the still present fear and the 
“slapping” the Greek-Orthodox minority received during the past years 
(Theodorakis, 2013). Young people took advantage of the social media to make the 
situation known and fill the gap in information from the television channels. 
“Without Twitter, it would not have been understood how big and hard that which 
happened was” and “Protesters with a mobile became cameramen and reporters, 
uploaded photos, raw video and texts to the social media” say people who took 
part in the protests (translation made by the author) (Boboula, 2013).  
Of great importance is the fact that there were some voices that accused the 
minorities for the unrest caused in the country. These voices, although few, came 
from the field of politics and the academic environment. Specifically, the head of 
the Yeniköy (Nihori) municipality, Engin Cevahiroğlu, blamed the Greek-Orthodox 
for their active participation in the events of Geza Park, while Professor Ahmet 
Atan, Dean of the Faculty of Fine Arts at Yildiz University, argued that minorities of 
the city played an active role in the episodes at Taksim. He concluded with the 
words “Please, check your kin” implying that the protesters probably were not 
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genuine Turks (translation made by the author) (Manolakellis, 2013). Although 
these statements were disapproved by the majority, they awoke old memories. But 
since Turkey’s progress depends mainly on the degree of its democratization, 
something that both the minorities and the Turkish people acknowledge, the Greek-
Orthodox are disposed to resist adversity having on their side this time plethora of 
Turks who participate mainly in liberal movements (Manolakellis, 2013; Kesisoglou, 
2013). Thus, despite the shrinking remaining minority, the Patriarchate has begun 
the reconstruction of nearly ninety churches since 1990, while four years ago, in 
collaboration with the Beyoğlu Greek Society it began restoring funerary 
monuments in the cemetery in Şişli, which was completed in 2014. As a matter of 
fact, on November 21, 2014 after the mass for the Presentation of Mary, the 
screening of a documentary on the cemetery of Şişli under the title “Those who 
Depart this World, Die Only when Forgotten” took place (Anastasiadou & Dymon, 
2007:159; Kiousis, 2014; Zikakou, 2014). In the cemetery, which was created in the 
19th century initially in the area of Taksim and later transferred to Şişli, rest a 
number of prominent scientists and entrepreneurs of the community. The fact that 
since 2005 it borders with a commercial center, made its future uncertain, but in 
the year 2014 the Greek-Orthodox community proved its will and strong voice 
(Anastasiadou & Dymon, 2007:264,267). Despite there being many, who regard the 
community’s future as bleak, there are even more who are optimistic. I will close 
with the words of Stelios Berberis, a cantor of the Patriarchate and performer of 
Rebetico, “Our title is not “the last Greek-Orthodox of Polis”. The Polis has the 
power to give birth once again to Greek-Orthodox and hides this power inside of it, 
because the seed lies here. Wherever the seed went, it originated here” (translation 
made by the author) (Theodorakis, 2013). 
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3. Memories remembered memories forgotten: the role of collective 
memory 
 
Since the present chapter will be based mostly on oral narratives, I will begin with a 
brief discussion on the contribution of oral narratives in history as well as in other 
disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology. To begin with, Paul Thompson, 
professor of social history, reminds us that oral history is the first type of history 
and refers to Herodotus who relied on witnesses to crosscheck the information he 
received, while Voltaire criticized the validity of oral tradition claiming that it had 
“frayed” during transport from one generation to another and insisted that history 
should be enlightened by philosophy, but he himself made use of oral evidences in 
his works (Thompson, 2008:22,55,61,63). During the nineteenth century the use of 
oral sources was sidelined and written documents were considered as the most 
reliable historical source, however Thompson argues that history acquires a new 
dimension when using oral testimonies. If one is to take as a given that most of the 
archives represent the view of power, and as a result history is limited to certain 
established circles, the usage of people’s personal experiences stemming from all 
backgrounds permits a more equitable and democratic evaluation of the past. If 
other “voices” from lower social classes are to be taken into account, then the past 
can be reconstructed in a more realistic way (Thompson, 2008:22, 34-35).  
On the other hand, oral narratives entail a certain amount of risk and tend to 
become insufficient if not properly treated by the historians, who must be versed 
and skilled in collecting them. For instance, a researcher may conduct interviews 
and in many cases try to add or remove elements in his notes in order thereby to 
contribute to the verification of what he attempts to prove. Skill is also required in 
the selection of the interviewees, who must fulfill certain criteria and be a 
representative sample of a community, group etc. Regardless the fact, whether this 
method has positive or negative elements34 (always dependent on the manner the 
                                                 
34 The advantages and disadvantages of oral history are not limited in those referred here. However, 
since the chapter’s purpose is not this, there is no extensive reference regarding the benefits and 
drawbacks.  
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researcher handles it), it is undoubtedly an integral and necessary part of 
conducting historical research (Thompson, 2008:51, 166-167).  
Moreover, as highlighted in Thompson’s book The voice of the past, “While 
oral history cannot be an autonomous “part” of history it is a technique that may be 
used in any branch of science” (Thompson, 2008:117). Thus, sociology and 
anthropology, which focus on how people experience social life and participate in it, 
use oral testimonials. In the following sections, the narratives of people who 
experienced a traumatic event, like the Septemvriana, demonstrate how people 
identify themselves and share a common past. It is through collective memory that 
people gain a collective narrative about a mutual past and it is also this process that 
provides them with a “cognitive map”, which defines who they are and where they 
are going (Thompson, 2008; Eyerman, 2004:161). The fact that the narratives 
sometimes converge and sometimes not, has to do with the conflict of collective 
and individual memory, as I will try to illustrate below.  
In the first section the case of a cosmopolitan neighbourhood in Istanbul, 
Kuzguncuk, where people from various backgrounds still living in Constantinople 
describe the daily coexistence and the riots of September 1955, will be discussed. 
The residents largely denied that the Septemvriana happened in the neighbourhood 
or they kept quiet about them. This neighbourhood was chosen since due to its 
multiethnic character and architecture of Ottoman era wooden houses it was often 
projected in the media and began to be gentrified by 1978 (Mills, 2008:387). The 
second section will make use of narratives from members of the Greek-Orthodox 
community from different areas in Constantinople. The narratives I used in this 
section come from people who today live in Greece. The reason I selected 
narratives told in Greece is to compare them with those narrated in Kuzguncuk. I 
will try to illustrate the different perspective the Greek-Orthodox, who live now in 
Greece, have of the Septemvriana and their daily life and relations with the Turks, 
Armenians and Jews. In this case, the tellers describe the events as they happened, 
without trying to avoid them or keeping quiet.  
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3.1 “We were all brothers”35: The case of the Kuzguncuk neighbourhood  
 
Kuzguncuk is a neighbourhood on the Asian side of Constantinople which is known 
for its past cosmopolitan character, since before the anti-minority riots of 
September 1955 it was a multiethnic mosaic composed of Muslims, Greeks, 
Armenians and Jews. The research conducted by Amy Mills is based on place 
narratives that put emphasis on the nostalgia for a “home” that no longer exists and 
the function of individual and collective memory as well. All narratives related to 
the daily past life in Kuzguncuk are sharing a common image. The neighbourhood is 
described as the ideal place to live, as all residents, regardless their ethnicity or 
religion, used to participate in each other’s religious and social activities, shared the 
food and used to stroll together on summer evenings (Mills, 2008; Mills, 2010:107). 
Mills (2010) quotes a part of Güngör Dilmen’s play: 
 
Mistakes were quickly repaired. To apologise was like a cure. Tough guys would never yell 
in front of the church, nor at Nightingale Greek. Good manners were something one took 
very seriously as rituals performed sincerely, never just for show. Let’s walk together up 
Icadiye36, to its end in the evening. From neighbour to neighbour, little trays, plates, bowls 
coming and going, covered with care as if the saying, “What’s cooked at the neighbours’ 
will come to us” was written for Icadiye. Sweets would go, stuffed grape leaves would go, 
and pudding would come back… The fragrance is gone, the neighbour is longed for (pp. 
107-108).  
 
Güngör describes the neighborhood as a gorgeous place were kinship and amity 
prevailed. Now in present time, he reminisces the past and actually mourns for the 
lost neighbourhood, fragrance, for the absolute home (Mills, 2010:108). The 
following narrative highlights the strong relations developed between people of 
different ethnoreligious backdrop and especially the teller points out the close 
relations between Muslims and Jews (Mills, 2010):  
 
                                                 
35 The phrase was taken from Amy Mills’ work Streets of memory: Landscape, tolerance, and national 
identity in Istanbul (Mills, 2010:107). 
36 Icadiye is the main street of Kuzguncuk.  
   
  -59- 
The unleavened bread for the Passover holiday was made by hand. A family friend would 
make a neat little packet of it for us. That Jewish family took care of me. At that time 
everyone was together; there was no difference except in a name. When someone from 
the [Christian] community died, Muslims would go to the church […] Everything was good 
[with people] from the beginning, without asking for anything…The Jews and Greeks did 
the best embroidery. The women did it in their homes…[A Jewish neighbour] would ask me 
to come and talk to her so she wouldn’t fall asleep while she was working, and I would 
finish the edges for her or read aloud a novel. We’d sit three or four nights in a row (pp. 
115-116). 
 
The repeated story about the beauty of Kuzguncuk produces the collective 
memory through which the residents share a common tie with the neighborhood 
and consequently a common identity, that of Kuzguncuklu37. For Maurice 
Halbwachs memory is a social process and more precisely, “It is in society that 
people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, 
recognize, and localize their memories” (Mills, 2010:111; Halbwachs, 1992:38). He 
argues that it is impossible for individuals to remember if they are not members of a 
group. Actually, he supports that “only group members remember” and if the 
autobiographical memories are not shared by other members, they eventually fade 
away (Halbwachs, 1992:24). Such paradigms of collective memory are also depicted 
in the following testimonies, described by Mills (2010), from a middle-aged Muslim 
man: 
 
There used to be Turks, Greeks, Armenians and Jews. On Sundays everyone would walk 
side by side on Icadiye Street. It was very pleasant. They were all one, all being Kuzgucuklu. 
There are a mosque and church next to each other in Kuzguncuk [...] My teacher was 
Greek; he had to go back to Greece but he didn’t want to. We saw troubles...They [the non-
Muslims] were quality people [...] We had a football team and played football together. 
The team was mixed Jewish and Armenian, but beacuse there were many more Greeks 
they made up their own team. Kuzguncuk changed a lot. No one is left. It was a mosaic, but 
not one beautiful thing remained (pp. 113-114). 
 
                                                 
37 In Turkish the suffix -lu/-lü/-lı/-li after a place name suggests the origin. Hence, Kuzguncuklu indicates 
someone who is from Kuzguncuk.  
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While in another article of his, Mills quotes (2008): 
 
That place we grew up, it was the place we lived, our place, our citizens, from local Greeks, 
Armenians, with Turkish citizens; all of us there were like siblings… We had a beautiful 
life…We were all like siblings; we had no problems… All of us there never argued, all of us, 
from poor to rich we loved each other very much; there were never any divisions, no 
divisions like “I’m rich, you’re poor”. We lived such a life in Kuzguncuk, though now of 
course, I don’t know… I left Kuzguncuk thirty-five years ago… I grew up there and still until 
now I can speak Greek, rather a lot ... because I would go out and we had friendships with 
Greeks…The Muslims there would even speak our language, you know. They spoke 
Spanish; it was such a beautiful life, Ottoman times I can say. I don’t remember the 
Ottoman city, I didn’t grow up in Ottoman times, but what remains there of the Ottomans 
is very beautiful… Because we are Kuzguncuklu Jews, our Muslims over there loved us very 
much. Loved us very much (p. 383). 
 
 Both cases represent the peaceful coexistence of all different communities, the 
close frindship and the absense of any arguments. They seem to long to be 
Kuzguncuklu and be included as part and take on the identity of this 
neighbourhood. That is, they “mourn” for the loss of their common neighborhood 
identity. What is more, in the first narrative the man refers to the deparure of the 
non-Muslims but he avoids to stress the reason. In the second case, the same 
“silence” can be observed (“I left Kuzguncuk thirty-five years ago”), while he 
contrasts the past situation by saying that there were no divisions, implying that 
now they exist and when he refers to the beauty of the Ottoman past, which he did 
not experience, implicitly he compares the Ottoman times with the present Turkish 
national situation (Mills, 2010:114; Mills, 2008:383).  
The fact that the collective memory of the Kuzguncuklus reproduces a perfect 
place, where there were no distinctions between the various ethnic groups, has to 
do with the fact that these people, Muslims and non-Muslims, experienced a 
traumatic event (Septemvriana). According to the authors of My Neighbor, My 
Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, regarding the 
post-war Yugoslavia and Rwanda, people who had experienced similar traumas 
tended to idealize the past and talked about an ideal coexistence with other 
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different groups, but as the authors observe this “perfect” life was actually an 
illusion. More precisely, they claim that people “failed to acknowledge that ethnic 
divisions had begun to occur in the years and months before the war” and it is 
estimated that their memories are muddled either due to the trauma or to their 
need to believe in that past in order to balance the miserable present (Doumanis, 
2013:55).   
Similarly, the people of Kuzguncuk idealized the past due to the traumatic 
experience of the Septemvriana. However, unlike the above case, where the 
refugees are accused of “ignoring” the political changes that occurred, the 
Kuzguncuklus were aware of the distinctiveness that “separated” them. Thus, with 
the exception of the testimonies glorifying the local collective memory, there are 
narratives that illustrate the existence of ethnic-religious differences, which were 
kept in balance but also were the seed that led to fragmentation (Mills, 2010:117). 
Particularly, a Muslim woman (Mills, 2010) says:  
 
In those days the main street was a creek; it was a clean place…We used to walk around 
along the seaside…There were Greeks and Jews, all friends together, everyone was close 
and loved to help each other… We had close Jewish friends, but they all sold their houses 
and went. When they were going to Palestine they were on boat and someone exploded 
the boat and they all died. We were all very sad about it. We loved Jewish people. When 
they were sick we went to them. When you were sick, they would always come to you […] 
We celebrated Jewish holidays and ate unleavened bread with them. We celebrated Easter 
with Greek friends and went to the church to light a candle […] We didn’t go to the 
synagogue. The Jews didn’t go there much either […] But everyone went to the church (p. 
117). 
 
Although this woman repeats the collective story about Kuzguncuk and the 
neighbourliness among people, she makes a clear separation of religious identity, 
partial however, since she says that they (Muslims) visited the Orthodox churches, 
but not the synagogues (Mills, 2010:117-118). She also adds, maybe as an excuse, 
that neither the Jews went frequently to the synagogues. Furthermore, she talks 
about the departure of the Jews and the tragic outcome of the incident with the 
boat, yet she does not make any reference to the cause that led to their departure.   
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What is more, when the conversation comes to the events of September 1955, 
the majority of individual narratives falls into contradictions. Although Vryonis 
affirms that the riots also spread in Kuzguncuk, though they were of a smaller scale 
due to a coincidence38, the Kuzguncuklus, both Muslims and non-Muslims, in an 
attempt to preserve the collective memory, either avoid confessing openly that 
violence took place in the neighbourhood, or support that such events never 
happened there, or even put the blame on outsiders (rural Muslims coming from 
Anatolia). However, in the place narratives the collective memory is “betrayed” in a 
fashion  either by hashing up or by omitting information, or the narratives include 
contradictions, while there are others who speak, more rarely, openly about the 
existing tensions (Mills, 2010:110, 112; Vryonis, 2007:237). Thus, while two Greek 
women claim that their Turkish friends protected the church and other Greek 
friends of them, they go on to add that (Mills, 2010): 
 
Neighbourliness has disappeared. After the 6-7 September events, places died. In the old 
days there was civilization. Between Jew, Armenian, and Greek, there was no rudeness. 
Then when they began to come (the rural migrants) it got ruined. There used to be two 
hundred thousand Greeks in Istanbul, but everyone has left. Jews went to Israel […] 
Kuzguncuk used to be a beautiful place (pp. 122-123). 
 
Another elderly Muslim woman says (Mills, 2010): 
 
The 6-7 September events didn’t happen in Kuzguncuk, but I heard about it. They 
stole…vandalism…it happened in [the districts of] Beyoğlu, Eminönü, and Sultanahmet. Our 
people [Muslims] put them [minorities] out in the street. Oh, the things that happened, the 
things that happened…Sounds of tanks were heard here. The noise carried from the other 
side of the city […] On that night they destroyed the churches…I had three or four Christian 
friends and I protected them; they stayed in my house. Then after that the Greeks began to 
leave and go to America; my friends left. My close friends…during the bad times they 
stayed with me for fifteen days…After the 6-7 September riots, they began to look for 
reasons to make the Greeks and Armenians leave […] Turks, Jews, Armenians were not 
                                                 
38 Vryonis cites a witness, according to which thanks to muhtar and an officer’s mediation the 
disembarkation of demonstrators in the neighbourhood was prevented. That is why the damages were 
not so extensive (Vryonis, 2007:237). 
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separate in those times. There was no anger at each other. It was when the doctor was 
killed in Cyprus that it got bad here [this is her explanation for why the 1955 riots started]. 
Then those who came from Anatolia did it to us. They took their goods; they hit the 
churches; there were Turkish houses next to the churches. It was the people who came 
from Anatolia who did it. They broke into the houses; they tied the tanks’ wheels and tore 
fabrics in the houses…We heard sounds…They cut the rugs; they ruined things; they took 
the mattresses of the beds and cut them and threw the wool out of the windows. They 
broke the glass […] What sins were committed here […] We killed those who did bad things 
to us. We protected those who were good. In was it wasn’t normal time (pp.124-125). 
 
The above narrative presents contradictions related to the Septemvriana. While the 
woman initially declares that the riots did not happen in Kuzguncuk and describes 
the events that she heard about, in the course of her narration, she describes the 
riots that happened in the neighbourhood in sufficient detail. In addition, she talks 
about a war situation, through which she tries to justify the events (Mills, 
2010:125). Additionally, on the one hand she sympathizes with minorities saying 
“Those who came from Anatolia did it to us”, while later she cites herself between 
those who committed the atrocities claiming that “We killed who did bad things to 
us”. According to Mills, the ambiguities of this narration are related to the 
juxtaposition between collective and individual memory. At the beginning of the 
narrative (“The 6-7 September events didn’t happen in Kuzguncuk”), the Muslim 
woman retains the collective memory and speaks both as a member of the 
neighbourhood, namely as a Kuzguncuklu, and broadly as a Turkish citizen, 
protecting in that way also the state’s narrative, which denies the riots against the 
non-Muslim minorities. Later on, when she talks about the riots that happened in 
Kuzguncuk she “betrays” the collective memory and describes what she saw and 
experienced as an individual (Mills, 2010:110,125).  
In the testimony that follows, although the narrator tries to defend the 
collective memory, the divisions between Muslims and non-Muslims are clearly 
indicated. The Jewish interviewee, who tells the story as heard from his parents, 
refers not only to those who came from Anatolia but also to some other Muslims, 
Kuzguncuklus, who actually contributed in some way to the riots. More precisely 
(Mills, 2010):  
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The 6-7 September events were very dramatic, very sad in Kuzguncuk, and Jews were also 
affected by these negative events. But in Kuzguncuk Greek houses were pillaged and 
vandalized with stones and it was done by people who came from Anatolia, although some 
of the Turks here showed them the way, saying, “This house is Greek; throw it over there; 
this house is Jewih; don’t throw a stone here”. These are sad things but they were done by 
those who came later. In Kuzguncuk whether Muslim, Greek, Armenian, Jewish, there was a 
good relationship between them, there was a good feeling of siblinghood. This was a very 
sensitive time (p. 126).  
 
The tensions depicted in the above narration are also found in the words of a non-
Muslim couple, when the husband affirms openly “This was a terrible event that 
happened all over the city. The riots were not just near Beyoğlu like people think. It 
was a mad, crazy violence that happened in Kuzguncuk, too”, while his wife adds 
“terrible things happened to girls in their homes” (Mills, 2010:126).  
To conclude, from all these narrations it becomes evident that there were in 
fact ethnic-religious distinctions between the different ethnic groups. In spite of 
neighbourliness, religion was a significant factor that shaped individual identity. 
Actually, the place narratives reveal a complicated space, where religion was a 
separation element, since it created different religious identities, on one hand, 
while simultaneously ties to a local place constructed a common identity, that of  
Kuzguncuklu. Specifically, Güngör Dilmen, an extract of whose work has been 
quoted at the beginning of this section describing the peaceful coexistence of all 
residents regardless their ethnicity or religion, goes on to describe in the same play 
(Mills, 2010): 
 
Ekrem [a Muslim Kuzguncuklu]: So everything was all smiles and happiness? 
Ali [a Muslim Kuzguncuklu]: No dear, that would have been counter to human nature! 
There were also irritations and arguments. 
Ekrem: When we’d call them “heathen” how quickly they’d be against us…hesitant to say 
anything… 
Saranda [a Christian Kuzguncuklu]: With the wisdom that comes from being a minority! (p. 
127). 
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Yet, it was the riots of 1955 that made these divergences visible. Saranda’s last 
words confirm how the state’s nationalism discriminated between the identities of 
national Turks and minorities. The fact that the events of 1955 were concealed in 
most narratives and Kuzguncuk was remembered as a cosmopolitan place where 
tolerance prevailed is what makes one a Kuzguncuklu. Evidently, forgetting is part of 
the collective memory. However, the forgetting or remembering of the riots serves 
in different ways to express the Kuzguncuklu identity. For Muslims to remember the 
old days of peaceful coexistence with minorities and then their departure, confirms 
their identity as Kuzguncuklus. Regarding the minority members however, the 
recollection of the departures certifies their otherness (Mills, 2010). 
 
3.2 The collective memory of a community  
 
The case of Kuzguncuk is not the only one in Constantinople. The cosmopolitan 
character of the neighbourhood is found also in other areas of the city, where 
people from different ethnoreligious backgrounds coexisted. As mentioned above 
the aim of this section is to describe the daily life before the Septemvriana as well 
as the riots of 6-7 September 1955 as experienced by members of the Greek-
Orthodox community living in different districts of Constantinople, who now reside 
in Greece. The oral narratives I used in this part of my thesis were taken from the 
Historical Archive of the Refugee Hellenism (Istoriko Archeio Prosfygikou Ellinismou) 
of the Municipality of Kalamaria, Thessaloniki and they form a mere sample and not 
a consolidated position. Despite the fact that most of the narratives reveal a 
nostalgia for the past and the good days that are now long gone, at the same time 
they bring to the surface a suspicion that characterized the relationship of the 
Greek-Orthodox especially with the Turks. Thus when a man, who lived in Cihangir, 
a neighbourhood close to Beyoğlu (Pera), and came to Athens after the deportation 
of 1964 was asked about the relations with the Turks, he replied: 
 
In our block of flats there were Greeks and Turks. I do not remember any Jews and 
Armenians, but we were many Greeks in the block of flats…With the Turks…good relations, 
namely…there was let’s say… Οur parents had good relations with the Turks, we did not 
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have any problems with the roommates in the apartment building…Τhere was a suspicion, 
however in relation to the Turks (translation made by the author) (Pitsou, 2009). 
 
A woman from Arnavutköy (Mega Revma) when asked what language they spoke at 
home and if they were bothered by the Turks when they spoke Greek outside home 
says: 
 
Greek, Greek…no dear we loved each other anyway. We lived well. I can’t say differently. 
Of course we had our good days and bad days, but we did not experience what happens in 
the world today. We loved each other […] We played together only with Turks. In our 
village there were no Greeks. All were Turks. One-two families were Greek, elderly people 
[…] We had no relations with the Turks but we did not avoid them. When we had to go 
somewhere we did [she means to some social events of the Turks to which they were 
invited] (translation made by the author) (Kazantzidou, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, when she is asked whether the Turks respected their religious 
holidays, like the Epiphany and Easter she responds: 
 
Yes, yes, yes. Most of them. Look now, the Turks have another mentality. They are 
very…nationalists. And if they stir up, in their nationalism…oh dear…when they say 
“giaour”, they mean it. Do you know with how much hatred they said it? In the 
Septemvriana we suffered a lot. A lot (translation made by the author) (Kazantzidou, 2008). 
 
As it becomes evident, the woman’s narrative includes contradictions. On the one 
hand, she claims that they loved each other and that their relations were like all 
human ones with good and bad times. What is more, as a child she was playing with 
other Turkish children, given that in her neighbourhood (Kuruçeşme, Ksirokrini in 
Greek) the majority of residents were Turks with the latter respecting the Christian 
religious holidays. On the other hand, she points out that they (the Greek-
Orthodox) did not seek to establish relations with Turks and highlights the latter’s 
nationalism hinting at the events of September 1955 and the suffering that the 
Greek-Orthodox experienced.  
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The following narrative comes from a middle-aged man from Arnavutköy 
(Mega Revma), who currently lives in Thessaloniki. Like the previous two 
interviewees, he reminisces his childhood with nostalgia saying that when he was a 
child he used to play together with Armenian, Turkish and Jewish children, stressing 
characteristically “That is why we were a cosmopolitan city. Constantinople in 
general has tradition”. Nonetheless he speaks more openly than the previous two 
interviewees about the differences that “separated” the Turks from the Greek-
Orthodox, the Muslims from the non-Muslims. More precisely: 
 
At the place we were born we were persecuted if we spoke our language in public places, 
especially when certain events happened, either in ’55 or ’64. Generally, when there were 
turbulences with the Cyprus issue, people fanatisized and they glowered at us on the bus or 
in public places or when we went for a walk. In general, those years Pera was full of Greeks 
and when they heard us speak Greek, they told us to speak in their language. They insulted 
us, this issue bothered us […] In this way they poisoned us and we felt uncomfortable! In 
the country we were born! In the town we lived! These are some experiences, I have never 
been able to forget (translation made by the author) (Kazantzidou, 2008). 
 
And he continues by describing their relations with the Turks: 
 
At home we spoke Greek. Turkish not at all. First of all, our circle of acquaintances included 
only Greek-speaking people. Our parties consisted of Greeks. Our church, our school…We 
came into contact with very few Turks […] With people of other religions and ethnicities we 
only had professional relations, not friendly […] We were quite a closed society. Everything 
stayed between us. If someone [man or woman] were to have a relationship with a Turk, 
oh my God! Not because the Turkish youngs were not good, but generally people avoided 
them […] Unfortunately, even my nephew married a Turkish woman last year. My cousin, 
who has a travel agency in Constantinople, is quite well off. She no longer is suppressed. 
She feels herself equal to the Turks and her complaint is this; that her son married a Turkish 
woman. And she refers to this with bitterness and wells up. But there are no girls any more 
[He means there are not girls form the Greek-Orthodox community] […] The main [Turkish] 
newspapers were all anti-Greek. I do not remember any holding a neutral position. Being 
anti-Greek is generally considered to be patriot (translation made by the author) 
(Kazantzidou, 2008). 
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What stems from this narrative, apart from the nostalgia for the cosmopolitanism of 
the city during his childhood, is that the state’s nationalism, -I am not referring only 
to the events of September, but to the whole Turkification policy the state applied 
from its foundation onwards- created distinctions and produced different 
categories of belonging as a “Turk” or “minority” (Mills, 2008). The narrative 
stresses this otherness due to which the Greek-Orthodox formed a quite closed 
community, as well as avoided socializing with people of different ethnicities and 
religions. What is more, although he admits that the Turkish youngs are good 
people, he objects to his nephew’s marriage with a Turkish woman and stresses his 
cousin’s complaint about this marriage. 
As far as the riots of September 1955 per se are concerned, the collective 
narrative describes the anti-minority events in detail, in contrast to the prevailed 
“silence” encountered in narratives by the Kuzguncuklus (both Muslims and non-
Muslims). On the other hand, many of the interviewees report moments they 
received assistance by their Muslim neighbours and friends during the 
Septemvriana. The man who narrated the above, when asked about the 
Septemvriana, described how the Turkish neighbours, among them his Turkish 
teacher, Mekrube, protected them. Thanks to his teacher, who roused all the 
Turskish women of the neighborhood, a protective net was formed around the 
house pretending to laugh at the sufferings of the Greek-Orthodox and he 
continues describing the disasters: 
 
[...]down in the corner, 50 meters away from our house, lay Ikonomou’s grocery store. It 
had been ravaged. It had been looted. They had grabbed the most valuable things, loaded 
them in trucks and left. And the rest, everything that they could not be carried was set on 
fire. They burned evetything in the center of the store. And that smell, it will never leave 
my nose, never in my life! [...] Rapes occured and there were deaths...all the churches were 
destroyed. No church remained whole (translation made by the author) (Kazantzidou, 
2008). 
 
When asked from the woman already mentioned at the beginning of this 
section to begin recounting the events of 1955, she said “What to? What to say? I 
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don’t know. These stories confuse me”. Then, the woman taking the interview 
started to ask her some information and she replied: 
 
We had just sat down…soup. We had boiled meat at that time, I will never forget it. And as 
soon as we sat, some stones come through the windows, because the house was 
surrounded by open space. They broke our dishes, forks, windows, everything! Nothing 
was left standing. Only my sister’s room…the rest of the house was turned upside down. 
They left nothing. They entered from the back door, destroyed everything and then moved 
to the front. They passed through the front door and left. They made a bundle out of my 
sister’s things and put blankets and quilts inside! They left us with nothing. My father and 
brother in law didn’t even have any pants to wear the next day […] We were inside the 
house, but when they started hurling stones the next door neighbours invited us to go to 
them. The one side broke us [she means that they caused disasters] and the other 
protected us. And he was a very poor man, a great man. Despite having six children he 
invited us there […] Meanwhile, the other neighbour in order not to be seen as doing 
nothing went to the market ... he did what he did, he helped there supposedly by breaking 
something and returned  home [...] Now that I remember these scenes... again ... I am 
reliving them. Anyway (translation made by the author) (Kazantzidou, 2008).  
 
The fact that the woman is asked to start the narration concerning the 
Septemvriana on her own and is unable to respond, claiming that these stories 
confuse her, it is related to the traumatic events of that September. According to 
neurobiologists Bessel van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart a traumatic experience is 
recorded in the brain differently from a common memory. They argue that the part 
of the brain that actually “classifies” the memories, which is called hippocampus, in 
cases of traumatic situations it is suppressed and “results in amnesia for the 
specifics of traumatic experiences but not the feelings associated with them” 
(Whitehead, 2009:115).  Judith Herman, a psychiatrist contemporary to Pierre 
Janet, argues that the only way for someone to confront traumatic memories is to 
integrate them into his/her life’s narrative. Since the traumatic memory initially is 
not remembered, “it is the narrative integration that produces the memory of the 
traumatic event”. Traumatic memory may sometimes be “wordless and static”, just 
like in our case (Sturken, 1998:108). Despite the woman’s willingness to begin 
recounting, she feels confused and ultimately fails to say anything. Only with the 
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help of the woman who conducts the interview and starts to pose questions the 
interviewee starts talking about the events and gives details about what exactly 
happened in her family home. She also adds that when the first stones were hurled 
at their house they went to a neighbouring house of a Turk who protected them, 
which means that she was not present when the rioters pillaged her house. So far 
she narrates what she experienced as an individual. Later, she defends the Turkish 
neighbour who supposedly took part in the disasters (“he helped there supposedly 
by breaking something and returned home”), preserving the collective narrative of 
good neighbourliness.  
The struggle between individual and collective memory is found in the 
following narratives, where the informants on the one hand recall the riots against 
them and consequently the proof of their otherness and on the other hand they 
support that the rioters were not from Constantinople in an attempt to maintain 
their collective identity, as Constantinopolitans. A man who was not yet born when 
the riots broke out recounts the Septemvriana as heard from his parents: 
 
As my mother and father told me they broke everything. They marked the houses 
beforehand and then came and broke them. But our house…they did not damage it, 
because the doorman, was Turkish and he protected us […] Those who came and 
committed the crimes were from Asia; they were not Constantinopolitans […] The 
Constantinopolitan Turks protected us to a great extent (translation made by the author) 
(Pitsou, 2009).  
 
A woman from the Beyoğlu (Pera) district recalls that during the events they were 
not bothered and she justifies this notion by saying that the rioters did not enter to 
the city’s houses, instead of the villages’ ones, where not only had they entered but 
also they “bothered” the young girls. Then she says that her family found protection 
thanks to a neighbouring Turkish family. Specifically, 
 
In 1955 I was nine years old and I remember seeing outside things thrown on the ground, 
the churches burned. The Turks entered the stores and removed the new shoes, leaving 
the old ones; in the patisseries they had thrown everything on the ground…they took new 
clothes and left old ones behind. But…this situation…if something leaves a strong 
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impression, you remember it even if you are a kid […] But since we lived in the city they had 
not come into our homes. In some villages around here they had entered the houses and 
bothered the girls […] Next to us lived a very good [Turkish] family. When the troubles 
happened, the man did not take part, he just pretended to be sitting on the balcony and 
applauding them, in order for them to leave him alone and not attack him for not getting 
involved. And he said [to her mother] “Mrs. Malvina, go inside and sit and if something 
happens, all of you come and sit here” […] The majority of those who started the troubles 
were from the provinces. What I mean, the refined citizens of Polis were not […] After the 
events of September 1955 the Polis changed… we were more guarded (translation made by 
the author) (Kazantzidou, 2008). 
 
Despite the woman describing that the riots took place in Beyoğlu, she claims that 
the mob did not invade the homes of the city’s residents. On the contrary, this only 
occurred in areas outside the city. Moreover, she emphasizes the good relations 
with the Turkish neighbours, who both offered them their house as shelter and 
actually did not participate actively in violence. She goes on to claim that the rioters 
were not Constantinopolitans, retaining in that way the nostalgia for the place and 
the collective identity. However, her last words regarding the change after the 
events (“After the events of 1955, Constantiple changed...we became more 
guarded”) demonstrate the existing difference between Turkisk Constantinopolitans 
and Greek Constantinopolitans, with the latter to be the “other”.  
In another interview a man speaks directly about the distinctions of Turks and 
Greek-Orthodox, the fear and persecution they felt before and during the riots of 
September 1955: 
 
The fear began since the beginning of the Cyprus issue. Well, there was also fear before 
that. The Turk never loved the Greek. The Turk was always pretending, as did we. But after 
the events of September 1955, they openly expressed their dislike (translation made by the 
author) (Ioannidou, 1995).  
 
When asked if there was pressure for religious issues he responds: 
 
Of course they pressured us, but we were more fanatic. First of all, they intercepted us on 
our way to church; the common people, not the state. We argued and fought and thus we 
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became even more fanatic and went to our church [...] During religious celebrations we 
went to the church but we faced difficulties. They sat in the churchyard. The Turks caused 
trouble. We tried to be patient or sometimes even fought (translation made by the author) 
(Ioannidou, 1995). 
 
Regarding the events he says: 
 
Around 11 a.m., when we were sleeping, we heard a sound, they were breaking and 
ravaging, but they were not those from our neighbourhood. Those who were from our 
neighbourhood went to another neighbourhood in order not to be recognised. They came 
with trucks from other neighbourhoods carrying bats and axes and they [the rioters] 
entered into the houses, pillaged them and whatever was left they broke and ravaged it. 
They entered our house too. We were stunned. There were ten people in our house and it 
filled with at least a hundred people. They took almost everything. They left nothing. They 
were looking to find girls. We had a sister…we hid her under my mother’s bed (translation 
made by the author) (Ioannidou, 1995). 
 
This testimony illustrates in a stronger way the distinction created by the 
nationalism at a state level. More specifically, the teller claims that both sides 
(Turks and Greek-Orthodox) always pretended and the fear on the part of the 
Greek-Orthodox always existed. He does not attempt to defend his neighbours. In 
comparison to the previous narratives, he instead openly claims that they took part 
in the riots but they went to other areas so as not to be recognized. Furthermore, 
he declares that no Turk had told them what would happen to them and he results 
“It is what they say; a Greek with a Turk cannot be friends”.   
Comparing the above cases, namely the stories from Kuzguncuk told both by 
Muslims and non-Muslims who still live in Kuzguncuk, with those told by the Greek-
Orthodox, who recounted stories from other neighbourhoods and who do not live 
anymore in Constantinople, a noteworthy difference emerges.  The collective 
memory and consequently narrative of the Kuzguncuklus, which is characterized by 
a dominant “silence” over the riots complies with the state’s narrative which denied 
the violence against the minorities and generally ignored minorities for the sake of a 
purely Turkish (ethnically) state. On the contrary, the narratives of the Greek-
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Orthodox are more enlightening given that they do not avoid speaking openly both 
about the events of September 1955 and the wider anti-minority policy of the state, 
with all the consequences this entails, and which ultimately the Greek-Orthodox 
had to suffer through. They speak without inhibitions, probably because they now 
live away from the place of origin and therefore in another national context. They 
do not live in fear of possible repercussions and under the thumb of oppression.  
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Conclusions 
 
What emerges from the above mentioned is that despite the long-suffering 
historical course of the Greek-Orthodox community, it managed to survive, 
although its future is in question. Descendants of the Eastern Roman Empire, 
members of the Rum milleti during the Ottoman Empire, the Greek-Orthodox 
managed thanks to the reforms of the Tanzimat, which guaranteed some freedoms, 
to hold high offices within the government and be recruited for educational, 
administrative, judiciary even diplomatic posts. Nonetheless, the changes that took 
place over the transition from the Ottoman Empire to a new secular state in 1923, 
affected the flourishing of the Greek-Orthodox community as well. The Turkification 
policy followed by the newly established state was essentially intended to exclude 
the non-Muslim minorities, whose rights were recognized by the Lausanne Treaty, 
yet systematically neglected by the Turkish state.  
The historical course of the Greek-Orthodox did not leave unaffected both the 
Greek and Turkish cinema. The Pains of Autumn, a film which is viewed from the 
Turkish perspective, illustrates fairly objectively the riots of September 1955 by 
providing a clear picture of Turkish nationalism and its consequences on the Greek-
Orthodox community. Financially and psychologically fragmented, the Greek-
Orthodox lost any trust towards the Turkish state for fair and equal treatment. 
Some of them left Constantinople, some were unable to leave, while some others 
remained in defiance of the antiminority atmosphere that stroke all sectors of the 
community’s life. Tassos Boulmetis’ semiautobiographical film A Touch of Spice puts 
emphasis on the memory and nostalgia for the lost homeland -an active and 
forward-looking type of nostalgia though- as well as the way the community’s 
identity was stigmatized both by the traumatic experience of the deportations and 
their arrival in Athens, where the Greeks received them as Turks. Such treatments 
reinforced the nostalgia for the place of origin, which is finds release both by 
frequent trips to Constantinople and through the establishment of associations that 
aim, inter alia, to preserve and nowadays mostly to help disseminate the Greek-
Orthodox culture and identity to the younger generations. The image of the 
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community in Constantinople does not differ a lot from that in Athens. The fact that 
the youth, Turkish and Greek-Orthodox, is closer to each other than it used to be in 
the past, causes concern to the community’s members-guardians, who are 
struggling to keep alive the Greek-Orthodox heritage and identity.  
The role of collective memory is of great significance for the preservation of 
identity. The collective memory, which includes the remembering or forgetting of 
events, provides members of a community with a collective narrative through which 
they share a common past that ultimately defines who they are today, how they 
came here and where they are going. However, collective memory is sometimes 
“betrayed” by the individual memories and thus, though in very few cases, some 
Kuzguncuklus spoke openly about the violence of the Septemvriana, instead of the 
Greek-Orthodox residing now in Greece who mostly referred in detail to those riots. 
What makes these narratives differ so much is the national context in which they 
are told.  
The issue arising from the historical course of the Greek-Orthodox community 
in Constantinople raises questions about its future. Is it possible for the community 
to continue to exist and multiply or is it doomed to disappear? Related to this, there 
are those who choose to look at the future with optimism, despite the fact that it is 
no longer possible to talk about a purely Greek-Orthodox community, since the 
issue of mixed marriages is now an inescapable reality. Moreover, the activity of the 
Greek-Orthodox outside of Constantinople contributes in an important way to the 
community’s preservation. Last but not least, the possible accession of Turkey to 
the European Union is an encouraging factor for those who are optimistic, although 
the road is long. On the other hand, however, in recent years Turkey shows a more 
conservative face towards not only minorities, but also to native Turks. Evidently, 
the issue of the fate of the Greek-Orthodox community in Constantinople remains 
to be explored. The answers lay rather in the political developments that are 
imminent in Turkey.   
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